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“The love of wealth is therefore to be traced, as either a principal or accessory
motive, at the bottom of all that the Americans do.”
Alexis de Tocqueville 1841.
1 Introduction
The model of optimal capital accumulation with infinitely lived agents developed by
Ramsey (1928) is one of the most popular models in macroeconomics. As infinitely
lived agents are now often reinterpreted as dynasties of altruists (see Barro, 1974),
it forms the core of many models of economic growth and it is extensively used for
analyzing the effects of government policy.
In Barro-Ramsey framework, it is well known that all the capital would end up in
the hands of the most patient (or alternatively, the most altruistic) households in a
competitive equilibrium.1 Before Ramsey (1928), as noted by Boyd (2000), Rae (1834)
and Fisher (1930) had already suggested that the most patient households accumulate
all of the capital.
This result seems to be robust since it holds as soon as there exists some agents with
infinite horizon (infinitely lived agents or unconstrained altruistic agents). Indeed, in
societies with at least an agent à la Barro-Ramsey, the steady state is always2 Pareto
optimal and the long-run capital stock, driven by the degree of patience (or altruism)
of the most patient (or altruistic) agents, is only held by these agents.
The main goal of this paper is to question these well established results in optimal
growth theory by constructing a simple and realistic overlapping generations model
which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumu-
lation and wealth distribution, and to yield some new and surprising conclusions about
fiscal policy. Then, our paper can be viewed as an alternative modeling of dynamic
wealth distribution that is generally dealt with using calibrated versions of stochastic
growth models3 or using theoretical models with imperfect credit market4.
1This property has already been conjectured by Ramsey (1928) and it has been formally proved
by Rader (1971), Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987) for the case with borrowing constraints,
and by Bewley (1982) for the case without borrowing constraints.
2See Muller and Woodford (1988), Nourry and Venditti (2001) or Thibault (2005).
3An elegant way to generate non-degenerate wealth distribution consists of introducing some idio-
syncratic uninsurable risks in a growth model and calibrate it to fit data. Calibrated economies
with Barro-Ramsey households have been for example studied by Aiyagari (1994), Castaneda, Diaz-
Giménez and Rios-Rull (1998, 2003) and Quadrini (2000) when agents have identical preferences or
by Krusell and Smith (1998) when agents differ regarding to time discount rate.
4These standard theoretical models on wealth accumulation and on wealth distribution (for exam-
ple, Banerjee and Newman, 1991, Galor and Zeira, 1993, Aghion and Bolton, 1997, Piketty, 1997, or
Matsuyama, 2000, 2006) generally have three main ingredients: imperfect capital market, exogenous
prices and warm-glow altruism. This form of altruism (joy of giving) is the most tractable, but it
implies, contrary to the data, that the wealth held by an individual always has an inherited component.
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1.1. Why do we need a new model ?
Recently, Mankiw (2000) presented three pieces of evidence suggesting that we need
a new macroeconomic model of fiscal policy. Indeed, the two canonical macrodynamic
models – namely the Barro-Ramsey model with infinite horizon and the standard OLG
model (due to Samuelson, 1958, and Diamond, 1965) with finite horizon – are incon-
sistent with the empirical finding that consumption tracks current income and with
the numerous households with near zero wealth. In addition, the Diamond-Samuelson
model is inconsistent with the great importance of bequests in aggregate wealth accu-
mulation. Then according to Mankiw (2000, p. 121): “A new model of fiscal policy
needs a particular sort of heterogeneity. It should include both low-wealth households
who fail to smooth consumption over time and high-wealth households who smooth
consumption not only from year to year but also from generation to generation. That
is, we need a model in which some consumers plan ahead for themselves and their
descendants, while others live paycheck to paycheck.”
From these observations, macroeconomists have focused on a new distinction to
segment society in a dual way, that between spenders and savers, which echoes that
introduced some time ago by Ramsey (1928) between people with high and low impa-
tience and more recently that between altruists and non altruists.5 The gist of these
later distinctions is that savers, patient agents or altruistic households, end up accumu-
lating wealth for the sake of transmission to their children whereas spenders, impatient
agents or non altruistic households, don’t save at all and if they do so, they do it for
their own future consumption.
The question one can raise at this point is whether such a simple representation
of society bears any resemblance to reality. In others words, is the degree of altruism
the key parameter of wealth accumulation? It is undoubtedly an important parame-
ter as without bequest motive dynastic wealth is not sustainable. Whatever the huge
wealth of Warren Buffet or Bill Gates their decision not to leave any sizeable bequest
to their heirs does not favor wealth accumulation on behalf of their descents. Admit-
tedly it is highly rare for a family fortune to last more than three generations, so much
so that there’s a well known adage: “Shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in three generations”.6
However, even if individuals differ in many respects including altruism, we observe
at the same time in real life societies that those who control capital accumulation are
5Among the models with “savers-spenders” such as presented by Mankiw (2000), let us mention
Michel and Pestieau (1998, 1999, 2005) who analyze the effects of alternative fiscal policies (debt,
PAYG, estate taxation) in settings where the only heterogeneity is the degree of altruism with fixed or
endogenous labor supply or where people vary according to altruism and productivity. Using the same
dichotomy “savers-spenders”, Smetters (1999) analyses the robustness of the Ricardian equivalence;
Nourry and Venditti (2001) study the stability and the determination of the long-run equilibrium,
Laitner (2001) try to explain secular changes in wealth inequality and inheritance in the US and UK
data and Thibault (2005) tries to explain the emergence of rentiers (i.e., of capitalists).
6Degan and Thibault (2007) analyze the dynamics of accumulation within a dynasty and explain
the emergence, the persistence and/or the disappearance of “rentiers” and “dilapidators” over time.
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not particularly altruistic. For instance, Arrondel and Laferrère (1998) who distin-
guish very wealthy and just wealthy in France, show that for the former altruism plays
a much smaller role than for the latter. More recently De Nardi (2004) and Reiter
(2004) developed general equilibrium models calibrated on US and/or Sweden data.
They show that altruism cannot explain the top tail of the wealth distribution. To do
it, they use growth models based on Max Weber’s theory of “the spirit of capitalism”
and a mathematical model of Kurz (1968): capitalists accumulate wealth for the sake
of wealth. To cite Weber (1958, p. 53): “Man is dominated by making of money, by
acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer sub-
ordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal
relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently a leading principle of
capitalism.”
This view has been shared by many other contemporary and past economists in-
cluding A. Smith, J.S. Mill, J. Schumpeter or J.M. Keynes7 and has been used by many
authors who have tried to explain growth and/or savings (see for instance Bakshi and
Chen, 1996, Gong and Zou, 2002, Zou, 1994, 1995, Carroll, 2000, De Nardi 2004, Re-
iter 2004 or Galor and Moav, 2006). To summarize, as argued by Carroll (2000): “the
saving behavior of the (American) richest households cannot be explained by models
in which the only purpose of wealth accumulation is to finance future consumption,
either their own or that of heirs.” Then, to explain such a behavior one has to assume
that some consumers regard accumulation as a end in itself or as channel leading to
power which is equivalent to assume that wealth is intrinsically desirable, what we call
here “preference for wealth”.
In a nutshell it seems that those who hold the bulk of private wealth are not so
much motivated by dynastic altruism as by a preference for wealth. In other words, the
key source of heterogeneity would not only be impatience or altruism but preference for
holding wealth. In this paper, we look at this issue by considering a society in which
individuals or rather dynasties are distinguished according to these two characteristics,
altruism and wealth preference.
1.2. An overview of our main results.
Let us describe the main results that we obtain in this paper by considering an OLG
economy with individuals differing in altruism and in preference for wealth. Those
with preference for wealth are labeled “hoarders-altruists”; even though their degree of
altruism can be nil. Those without such preference are either weak or strong altruists
(see Table 1). To summarize, our society can be view as a society which mixes agents
à la Diamond, agents à la Barro, hoarders with positive intergenerational bequest
motive and hoarders without intergenerational bequest motive. Depending on the
degree of altruism and the preference for wealth of these individuals, two kinds of
equilibrium and segmentation can emerge. In the first type, denoted Equilibrium I,
7See Zou (1992, 1994) for a review of the history of economic thought and more references on this
topic.
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only the hoarders-altruists leave a positive bequest. In the second type of equilibrium,
denoted Equilibrium II, only the weak altruists don’t bequeath.
Individual preferences Wealth transmission
Degree of Wealth Equilibrium I Equilibrium II
Types of agents Altruism γ Preference δ (two-class) (three-class)
Weak altruists weak (or nil) nil nil (spenders) nil (spenders)
Strong altruists strong nil nil (spenders) positive (savers)
Hoarders altruists positive (or nil) positive positive (hoarders) positive (hoarders)
Table 1: Social segmentation
Regarding capital accumulation, our results differ following the two types of equi-
librium. When the degree of altruism of the strong altruists is low, the stock of capital
can then exceed its Golden Rule (hereafter GR) level. In other words, equilibrium
I can be dynamically inefficient (marginal productivity of capital exceeds the rate of
population growth) even though agents motivated by a dynastic altruism leave positive
bequests. The result of “savers-spenders” models that it suffices to have one altruistic
agent leaving bequests for the economy to be dynamically inefficient does not resist
to the arrival of hoarders-altruists. When the altruism of strong altruists is sufficiently
high, then the stock of capital is ruled by a Modified Golden Rule (hereafter MGR)
based on their degree of altruism. We have then equilibrium II wherein the result of
“savers-spenders” models is verified: the stock of capital is in the long run ruled by the
most altruistic individuals.
Our findings are particularly interesting with regard to wealth distribution. The
bequeathing dynasties hold a strong stand as to the way aggregate wealth is shared.
In the two-class equilibrium, the hoarders impose their view and in the three class
equilibrium, both hoarders and savers impose their view. Thus in equilibrium II the
strong altruists who determine the MGR equilibrium are not the only ones to hold
wealth. The hoarders also hold some wealth.8 In this case wealth distribution is not
reduced to a single point, but reflects what can be observed in reality. We show that
it is possible that few hoarders with a low degree of altruism hold more capital than a
8We are not the first to exhibit theoretical variants of the Barro-Ramsey model in which the long-
run distribution of wealth can be non-degenerate. For example, Epstein and Hynes (1983) or Lucas
and Stokey (1984) show that there may exist stationary equilibria in which all households own positive
amounts of capital when preferences are described by recursive utility. Sarte (1997) establishes that
progressive taxation as another reason for the existence of stationary equilibria with a non-degenerate
wealth distribution. A non-degenerate wealth distribution is also obtained by Dutta and Michel
(1998) in a setting with imperfect altruism and linear price, by Boyd (2000) in an endogenous growth
framework with learning-by-doing or by Falk and Stark (2001) with other form of altruism. Recently,
Sorger (2002) shows, in the case where a government levies a progressive income tax, there exist
infinitely many stationary equilibria in which all households own positive capital stocks. However,
contrary to these papers, we are the first to obtain a distribution of wealth non-degenerate in a simple
framework with logarithmic (and not recursive) utility function and without taxation and in which
the standard MGR capital stock is definable and holds.
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large number of altruists with strong altruism.
With the relation between wealth holding and altruism being more complex than in
earlier models, we obtain new results concerning the incidence of fiscal policy. We first
summarize the main effects of PAYG pensions and of public debt. In equilibrium I these
policies reduce capital accumulation and can either increase or decrease the welfare of
both spenders and hoarders. In Equilibrium II, these policies don’t have any effect on
the stationary capital stock. However, as it appears on Table 2, they increase wealth
holding by the savers and decrease wealth holding by both spenders and hoarders.
Spenders Savers Hoarders
Share of capital held Decreased Increased Decreased
Welfare Decreased Increased Decreased
Table 2: Effects of a PAYG pension system or a public debt at the MGR equilibrium.
In the traditional “savers-spenders” models à la Mankiw, those fiscal policies seem
to be regressive as they were favoring the savers at the expenses of the spenders. Intro-
ducing hoarders leads to a different finding. Now there is a transfer of resource from
hoarders to the other individuals. Note also that a PAYG pension system or public
borrowing have an opposite effect of unconstrained altruists whether of not there exist
a preference for wealth, even a very light one. These two policies benefit the savers
and hurt both spenders and hoarders.
As to estate taxation our results differ also from those obtained in the “savers-
spender” setting. As it appears on Table 3, in the MGR equilibrium, estate taxation
reduces capital accumulation. It increases the share of capital held by spenders and
hoarders and decreases the share held by savers. Consequently, if one wants to hurt the
savers, estate taxation is good and if one wants to favor them, either PAYG pension
or public debt become the appropriate instrument.
Spenders Savers Hoarders
Share of capital held Increased Decreased Increased
Welfare Decreased Decreased
Increasedif δHO sufficiently large
Decreasedif δHO sufficiently low
Table 3: Effects of the estate taxation at the MGR equilibrium.
Estate taxation is clearly a questionable instrument of redistribution: it hurts the
wealthy, but favors the top wealthy. Moreover, estate taxation worsens the welfare
of both the spenders and the savers but increases (decreases) the one of the hoard-
ers if the degree of altruism of the savers is sufficiently high (low). We found here a
new reason to deal with estate taxation with caution. If the objective of such a tax is
to fight top wealth holding, we show that society might be better off using another tool.
5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 is devoted to the long-run capital accumulation and the long run wealth distribution.
Section 4 studies the incidence of public debt, social security and estate taxation. A
final section concludes. Proofs are gathered in Appendices.
2 The model
Consider a perfectly competitive economy which extends over infinite discrete time
periods. The economy consists of N ≥ 1 dynasties denoted by h ∈ {1, ..., N}. In
each period t, the size of each dynasty h is denoted by Nht and grows at rate n.
Total population size is Nt. We denote by p
h
t the positive relative size of each dy-
nasty h. It is time invariant. Hence, we have Nht /Nt = p
h
t = p
h,
∑h=N
h=1 p
h = 1 and
Nt+1/Nt = N
h
t+1/N
h
t = 1 + n.
Individuals of a dynasty h are identical within as well as across generations and
live for two periods. All dynasties are made of altruistic individuals. We adopt Barro
(1974)’s definition of altruism: parents care about their children welfare by including
their children’s utility in their own utility function and possibly leaving them a bequest.
When young, altruists of dynasty h, born at time t, receive a bequest xht , work during
their first period (inelastic labor supply), receive the market wage wt, consume c
h
t and
save sht . When old, they consume d
h
t+1 a part of the proceeds of their savings and
bequeath the remainder (1 + n)xht+1 to their (1 + n) children. Agents perfectly foresee
the interest factor Rt+1. Bequest is restricted to be non-negative, which is an important
assumption. We denote by V ht the utility of an altruist of dynasty h:
V ht (x
h
t ) = max
ch
t
,sh
t
,dh
t+1
,xh
t+1
ln cht + β ln d
h
t+1 + δ
h ln xht+1 + γ
h V ht+1(x
h
t+1)
s.t wt + x
h
t = c
h
t + s
h
t (1)
Rt+1s
h
t = d
h
t+1 + (1 + n)x
h
t+1 (2)
xht+1 ≥ 0
where V ht+1(x
h
t+1) denotes the utility of a representative child who inherits x
h
t+1. Para-
meter δh ≥ 0 measures the preference for wealth, γh ∈ [0, 1) is the intergenerational
degree of altruism of the dynasty h and β ∈ (0, 1] is the factor of time preference.
Importantly, contrary to Barro (1974), our log-linear life-cycle utility is not re-
stricted to depend only on life-cycle consumption. Indeed, the agent enjoys accumulat-
ing wealth for itself when δh > 0. The reasons why wealth directly enters in the utility
function have been previously explained in our introduction. Such a specification is
old. For example, before9 the well-known article of Kurz (1968), Yaari (1964) focuses
“on the notion that consumer preferences depend not only on the rate of consumption
but also on terminal wealth (or bequests). This notion is, of course, not new. Marshall
(1920, p. 228), for instance, refers to family affections as the chief motive of saving”.
9A theoretical discussion on this issue can also be found in the Tobin’s unpublished dissertation
(1947).
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In our economy, the heterogeneity comes from the two parameters triggering saving
(besides old age consumption): the preference for wealth δh and the degree of altruism
γh. Then, each dynasty h can be characterized by a pair (δh, γh) ∈ IR+ × [0, 1). From
each pair (δh, γh) we can define the key parameter γ¯h as follows:
γ¯h =
γh(1 + β) + δh
1 + β + δh
> γh.
This parameter represents a “modified degree of altruism” which is larger or equal
to γh. Indeed, when δh = 0 we have γ¯h = γh whereas γ¯h > γh as soon as δh > 0. This
modified degree of altruism modified by the wealth preference allows us to segment,
without loss of generality, the N > 0 dynasties as follows:
We first have M dynasties (M > 0) which have no preference for wealth (i.e.,
δh = 0) and are labeled from h = 1 to M . We assume that γM ∈ (0, 1) and (if M > 1)
γh ∈ [0, γM) for h ∈ {0, ...,M −1}. Therefore, M is the most altruistic dynasty among
the dynasties which don’t have any preference for accumulating wealth. By convention,
dynasties 1 to M − 1 are considered as dynasties of weak altruists (WA) whereas the
dynasty M is a dynasty of strong altruists (SA).
We then have N −M dynasties (N > M) which have some preference for wealth
(i.e., δh > 0) and are indexed h = M + 1, . . . , N . We assume that γh ∈ [0, 1) and
(if N > M + 1) γ¯h ∈ [0, γ¯N) for h ∈ {M, ..., N − 1}. Therefore, N is the dynasty
with the higher modified degree of altruism among the dynasties with preference for
wealth. In our terminology these N −M dynasties are dynasties of hoarders-altruists
(HA) whereas in the specific case where γh = 0, individuals are only hoarders and not
hoarders-altruists.
Maximizing V ht (x
h
t ) subject to (1) and (2) gives the following first order conditions:
∀h ∈ {0, N} dht+1 = βRt+1c
h
t (3)
∀h ≤ M −
(1 + n)β
dht+1
+
γh
cht+1
≤ 0 (= if xht+1 > 0) (4)
∀h > M −
(1 + n)β
dht+1
+
δh
xht+1
+
γh
cht+1
= 0 (5)
Unlike the M dynasties without wealth preference, the optimal bequests of the
N −M dynasties with wealth preference are necessarily positive at all date, and hence,
in the long run.
We can also write the saving of a given dynasty h. Indeed, we have:
sht =
1
1 + β
[
β(wt + x
h
t ) + φ(Rt+1)x
h
t+1
]
(6)
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where φ(R) = (1+n)/R can be interpreted as a dynastic discount factor. Thus, ceteris
paribus, the higher the inheritance xht and earning wt, the higher is saving. Saving
increases also with intended bequest xht+1.
Let us now turn to the production side. Production technology is represented
by a Cobb-Douglas function with two inputs, capital Kt and labor Lt i.e., Yt =
F (Kt, Lt) = AK
α
t L
1−α
t with α ∈ (0, 1) and A > 0. Homogeneity of degree one al-
lows us to write output per worker as a function of the capital/labor ratio per worker,
Yt/Lt = F (kt, 1) = f(kt) = Ak
α
t with kt = Kt/Lt, the capital/labor ratio.
Markets are perfectly competitive. Assuming, without loss of generality, that capital
fully depreciates after one period, each factor is paid its marginal product:
wt = f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) = A(1− α)k
α
t and Rt = f
′(kt) = Aαk
α−1
t (7)
In each period, the labor market clears, i.e., Lt = Nt and the capital stock at time
t + 1 is financed by the savings of the young generation born in t. Hence we have
Kt+1 = Ntst with st =
∑h=N
h=1 p
hsht . Therefore, in intensive form:
(1 + n)kt+1 =
h=N∑
h=1
phsht (8)
We finish this section by three remarks. First, our approach comprises a wide class
of OLG models.10 Second, we do not make any assumption on the sign of γ¯N − γM .
Finally, note that, according to Weil (1987) or Thibault (2000), the Barro’s (1974)
model with our Cobb-Douglas specification exhibits positive bequest if and only if
γM > ε ≡ β(1− α)/[α(1 + β)]. Even if, for the sake of generality, we allow for ε > 1,
we have to keep in mind that ε > 1 corresponds to the case where the Barro’s (1974)
model has constrained altruists.
3 Capital accumulation and wealth distribution
In this section, we restrict our analysis to the steady states. We first study the long
run behavior of hoarders-altruists. We have seen that their bequests xht are positive at
each date t. Then, according to equations (3) and (5) we obtain in the steady-state
denoted by subscript ⋆:
∀h > M ch⋆ =
φ(R⋆)− γ
h
δh
xh⋆ and d
h
⋆ = βR⋆c
h
⋆ (9)
10When N = M = 1 and γ1 ≤ ε ≡ β(1 − α)/[α(1 + β)] we obtain the Diamond’s (1965) model
(or equivalently the Barro’s (1974) model with constrained altruists). When N = M = 1 and γ1 > ε
we have Barro’s (1974) model with positive bequests. When N = M > 1 and γM > ε, we obtain
the Barro’s (1974) model with heterogenous dynasties studied by Vidal (1996). When N = M = 2,
γ1 = 0 and γ2 > ε our economy is similar to that studied by Michel and Pestieau (1998), Mankiw
(2000) or Nourry and Venditti (2001).
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Merging (1), (2) and (9) we obtain the (positive) level of stationary bequest of a
dynasty h of hoarders-altruists:
∀h > M xh⋆ =
δ¯hw⋆
φ(R⋆)− γ¯h
(10)
where δ¯h ≡ δh/(1 + β + δh). This term is the relative weight of wealth in the life-cycle
utility ln cht + β ln d
h
t+1 + δ
h ln xht+1. In the specific case of hoarders dynasty h without
intergenerational bequest motive (i.e., γh = 0), we can note that γ¯h corresponds to δ¯h.
Since, the bequest of hoarders-altruists is positive, the steady-state φ(R⋆) neces-
sarily satisfies γ¯N < φ(R⋆) and, according to (6) and (10), stationary saving s
h
⋆ =
xh⋆ + w⋆ − c
h
⋆ of a dynasty h of hoarders-altruists is given by:
∀h > M sh⋆ =
1
1 + β
(
β +
δ¯h [β + φ(R⋆)]
φ(R⋆)− γ¯h
)
w⋆ (11)
In the specific case of a hoarders dynasty h without intergenerational bequest mo-
tive (i.e., γh = 0), we can note that (11) gives (1+β)(φ(R⋆)− δ¯
h)sh⋆ = (β+ δ¯
h)φ(R⋆)w⋆.
We now turn to the dynasties with no wealth preference. According to equations
(3) and (4), the long-term behavior of each of them must satisfy:
∀h ≤M γh ≤ φ(R⋆) (= if x
h
⋆ > 0) (12)
Hence, among these M dynasties, only the strong altruists, i.e., the dynasty M
with the highest degree of altruism, has the possibility to leave a bequest. Indeed,
if there exists a dynasty m ∈ {1, ...,M − 1} such that xm⋆ > 0 then equation (12) is
not satisfied for dynasties h where h ∈ {m + 1, ...,M}. Then, the weak altruists are
constrained altruists in the long run and their saving sh⋆ is such that:
∀h ≤ M − 1 sh⋆ =
β
1 + β
w⋆ (13)
Things are more complicated for the behavior of strong altruists. However, accord-
ing to (12), if xM⋆ is positive then the steady state capital stock k⋆ is equal to that of
the MGR capital stock (i.e., k⋆ = f
′−1[(1 + n)/γM ]) and we have:
k =
[αAγM
1 + n
] 1
1−α
≡ kM⋆ , R =
1 + n
γM
≡ RM⋆ , w = A(1− α)
[αAγM
1 + n
] α
1−α
≡ wM⋆
For the altruists without wealth preference we follow Mankiw (2000) by labeling
as spenders the dynasties of constrained altruists and as savers the dynasties of un-
constrained altruists. Since the hoarders-altruists wish to accumulate capital for its
own sake we label them as hoarders. Then, to sum up our economy (see Table 1), we
have shown that the weak altruists are always spenders and the hoarders-altruists are
always hoarders. The case of the strong altruists is ambiguous: they are spenders when
xM⋆ = 0 and savers when x
M
⋆ is positive. As a consequence, the bequest motive of the
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strong altruists determines the long run wealth distribution of the society.
Knowing the saving function of each dynasty allows us to characterize the long run
capital accumulation in our economy. Indeed, using (6), (11) and (13) we can rewrite
the equation of capital accumulation (8) according to whether or not the strong altru-
ists leave a bequest.
When xM⋆ = 0, according to (11), (13), and using the fact that (1 + n)k/w =
αφ(R)/(1− α), the equilibrium condition (8) is equivalent to:
̥(φ(R⋆)) ≡
β(φ(R⋆)− ε)
ε (φ(R⋆) + β)
−
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
φ(R⋆)− γ¯h
= 0 (14)
This equation determines the capital stock of the economy when the strong altruists
are spenders.
When xM⋆ is positive, we have φ(R
M) = γM and according to (6), (11) and (13),
the equilibrium condition (8) gives:
xM⋆ =
[
β(γM − ε)
ε(γM + β)
−
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
γM − γ¯h
]
wM⋆
pM
= ̥(γM )×
wM⋆
pM
(15)
This equation determines the bequest left by the strong altruists in the steady-state.
Accordingly, the strong altruists are savers or spenders according to whether or not
̥(γM ) is positive.
From equations (14) and (15) we can now study both the existence of the steady
state and the long run capital accumulation of our economy.
Proposition 1 - The long run capital accumulation.
a – When strong altruists are insufficiently altruist, the steady state is a spenders-
hoarders equilibrium where the stationary capital stock k⋆ is the solution of (14).
This capital stock increases with the proportion, the degree of altruism and the wealth
preference of the hoarders but is independent of the degree of altruism of the spenders.
The stationary capital stock k⋆ is in
11 under-accumulation, at the GR or in over-
accumulation of capital if respectively
∑N
h=M+1 p
hδh/(1− γh) is smaller than, equal to
or larger than β (1− ε) /ε.
b – When strong altruists are sufficiently altruist, the steady state is a savers-
spenders-hoarders equilibrium where the stationary capital stock is equal to that of the
MGR capital stock kM⋆ .
11Over (under)-accumulation of capital occurs when k⋆ is greater (lower) than the golden rule (GR)
capital stock kG = f ′−1(1 + n). Using Cass (1972), k⋆ is said dynamically (in)efficient if and only if
k⋆ is in (over)under-accumulation of capital.
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This capital stock increases with the degree of altruism of the savers but is indepen-
dent of the proportion of each dynasty, and of the degree of altruism of the spenders
and the hoarders.
The stationary capital stock kM⋆ is below the GR level.
Proof – See Appendix A. 
In Appendix A, we exhibit a threshold value γ˜ (satisfying γ˜ ≥ γ¯N) of the degree of
altruism of strong altruism below which the strong altruists are insufficiently altruist
and, consequently, spenders and above which they are sufficiently altruist and, conse-
quently, savers.
The uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium is standard given the Cobb-Douglas
specification. It is however interesting to observe that even in this very simple setting
we end up with an endogenously segmented society.
The present paper generalizes the results of the “savers-spenders” models in several
respects. It presents a more realistic setting. Also, the introduction of agents with
two different characteristics (altruism and preference for wealth) allows for testing the
robustness of those models. Indeed, the mere introduction of at least one dynasty of
hoarders sizably affects the equilibrium and the resulting stratification.
Two patterns are now possible in the long term. In the first, we have a two-class
society with spenders and hoarders that has never been studied in the literature. The
spenders belong both to the weak and strong altruists whereas the hoarders belong
to hoarders-altruists. The second pattern generalizes the “savers-spenders” models by
introducing a third class: the hoarders. We now have a society of savers, spenders and
hoarders since in this pattern the strong altruists are savers.
We observe that the three-class result does not hold anymore when the hoarders
have a modified degree of altruism, γ¯h, that is high enough relatively to the others.
Indeed, it suffices that γ¯N > γM for not having savers, in other words, for having the
strong altruists bequeathing nothing. This does not mean that γN > γM . A low factor
of altruism γN is compatible with a high γ¯N . The degree of altruism γM of strong altru-
ists is nevertheless fundamental to determine which kind of equilibrium we end up with.
If it is to bequeath, the strong altruists needs to have a degree of altruism suf-
ficiently high, i.e., such that γM > γ¯N . Note that the value of γ˜ is independent of
the degree of altruism and of the proportion of the spenders. On the contrary this
threshold value γ˜ depends on the proportion and the degree of altruism of the N −M
dynasties of the hoarders. All things being equal the higher the proportion, the degree
of altruism and the wealth preference of the hoarders, the higher is the threshold γ˜ and
the lower is the likelihood to have a three-class equilibrium that vindicates the results
of Michel and Pestieau (1998) and Mankiw (2000).
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Importantly, the macrodynamic properties of the equilibrium spenders-hoarders are
very different from those of the equilibrium savers-spenders-hoarders. When strong al-
truists are savers, the economy is at the MGR steady state which depends on the degree
of altruism γM of savers, but not on their proportion. Note that this result is similar to
those of Kaldorian models (see, for instance, Kaldor, 1956, Pasinetti, 1962, or Britto,
1972) but it is obtained in an endogenous way. As well-known since Ramsey (1928) and
Becker (1980), the most patients (or altruists) impose their view on the long-run capi-
tal accumulation, whatever their size. Then, our savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium
seems to be equivalent to the equilibrium obtained in the “savers-spenders” models with
heterogenous agents with no wealth preference. It is however noteworthy that unlike
the “savers-spenders” models and contrary to Ramsey’s intuition,12 equilibrium II with
MGR has not two categories of individuals but three: savers, spenders and hoarders.
Equilibrium I has two categories of agents, but it is not consistent with the MGR.
At the microeconomics level the introduction of altruists-hoarders has an important
implication. Even though the dynasty of strong altruists imposes its view on capital
accumulation, it is not the only one to bequeath and hold wealth. The hoarders are
also bequeathing even though they can have a negligible degree of altruism. When
instead we have a spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the stock of capital is not any more
determined by a single dynasty. Now the stock of capital depends on both the degree
of altruism and on the preference for wealth of the N −M dynasties of hoarders and
on the proportion of each of them.
The fact that the logic of capital accumulation is totally different in the two equi-
libriums is reinforced by our results on the dynamic efficiency of the two steady-states.
These results also emphasize the influence of wealth preference. Even though all agents
have some altruism for their children, the competitive equilibrium can be dynamically
inefficient when some agents have some preference for wealth per se. Indeed at the
spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the higher the proportion, the degree of altruism and
the wealth preference of a dynasty of hoarders, the higher is the possibility of over-
accumulation. Thus the main result of Barro (1974) that dynastic altruism implies
dynamic efficiency does not resist to the introduction of agents having some preference
for wealth not just as a means of saving for retirement or for bequests but just for itself.
Intuitively it is clear that with such a taste for wealth the stock of capital is likely to
be higher than when there is no such a taste.
Things are different in the three-class equilibrium. The stock of capital being consis-
tent with the MGR, the economy is dynamically efficient irrespectively of the presence
of hoarders. To sum up, depending on the fundamentals, the introduction of hoarders
may have an impact or not on the accumulation of capital. Note that the introduction
of hoarders is not necessarily negative. Even when it increases the capital stock, it can
be efficient as long as the GR level is not overtaken.
12Even though optimal growth theorists and Ramsey in particular are not concerned by intragener-
ational issue, he notes in his 1928’s seminal paper that if agents differ in their time preference society
will be split in two classes: “the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence level”.
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To illustrate numerically the possibility of a dynamically inefficient equilibrium even
if all agents are altruistic, we now consider an economy in which the population consists
of a proportion p1 of weak altruists with degree of altruism γ1 < ε, a proportion p2 of
strong altruists with degree of altruism γ2 > ε and a proportion p3 of hoarders with
degree of altruism γ3. We adopt the following scenario: γ2 = 0.9, γ3 = 0.89, β = 0.5,
α = 1/3, A = 1 and n = 0. Clearly hoarders is very altruistic. On Figure 1, we see
how the steady-state stock of capital changes with δ and increasing values of p3. The
GR level of capital is given by the horizontal dotted line. The MGR is given by the
horizontal segment of the continuous line. When the proportion of hoarders is very low
(1/140) the economy follows the MGR as long as δ 6 0.25. When δ > 0.25 we have
a two-class equilibrium but the level of capital stock stays dynamically efficient. In
this particular case, increasing wealth preference can be viewed as socially desirable.
When the proportion of hoarders is a bit higher, we have the three-class equilibrium
for low values of δ (δ = 0.1 for p3 = 13/160). When δ increases, we move to the two-
class equilibrium but also to dynamically inefficient capital stocks. For p3 = 1/3 the
economy turns dynamically inefficient for δ = 0.1. To summarize, Figure 1 provides an
example showing how Barro (1974)’s intuition that dynastic altruism leads to dynamic
efficiency is not robust to a slight introduction of preference for wealth.
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Figure 1: Capital accumulation and dynamic efficiency
We now turn to the way capital is held by the different agents. So doing we obtain
a better grasp of the long run distribution of wealth in the two alternative equilibria.
One of the motivations of this paper was to show that top wealth is not necessarily held
by the strong altruists, which was the conclusion as soon as there exists some savers
(infinitely lived agents or unconstrained altruistic agents).
Comparing to the “savers-spenders” literature, our model seems to be most relevant
to study the long term distribution of wealth. In the earlier models relying on the
single characteristic of either patience or altruism, the equilibrium wealth distribution
was reduced to two points: positive wealth for the most patient or altruist, and zero
wealth for the others. By introducing some preference for wealth and thus the category
of hoarders we now have a more complex and realistic distribution of wealth. We now
have N −M + 1 or N −M types of wealth-holders. Indeed, it is straightforward that
the dynasties which held long run wealth are the dynasties of bequeathers. We could
get the share of wealth held by each of the N dynasties. However to keep the analysis
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simple, we now focus on the share of each of the three types of dynasties: savers,
spenders, hoarders. With this simple presentation, we now study the comparative
statics of this wealth-holding.
Proposition 2 - The long run wealth distribution.
a – At the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the higher the proportion, the degree of
altruism and the preference for wealth of hoarders, the higher is the fraction µHO of the
stationary capital k⋆ held by the hoarders and the lower is the fraction µ
SP held by the
spenders.
b – At the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the higher the degree of altruism of
the savers, the higher is the fraction νSA of the stationary capital kM⋆ held by the savers
and the lower are νHO and νSP the fractions respectively held by the hoarders and the
spenders. The higher is the proportion, the degree of altruism and the preference for
wealth of a dynasty of hoarders, the higher is νHO.
Proof – See Appendix B. 
Whatever the equilibrium regime, the spenders hold some capital that is related to
saving for retirement.13 The distribution of wealth in the equilibrium with spenders
and hoarders depends on the stock of capital, which is not the case of the three-class
equilibrium. The larger the capital stock, the higher is the share held by the hoarders.
Wealth sharing in the two-class equilibrium is more or less imposed by the behavior
of hoarders. Both the overall stock of capital and the share they hold increase with
their degree of altruism and their taste for wealth. Conversely, the share of wealth
held by the spenders is independent of their own characteristics. Intuitively, one could
say that the hoarders get the additional capital accumulation they generate
(
k⋆ − k
M
⋆
)
.
In the three-class equilibrium, things are clearly different. Sharing now depends
on the degree of altruism of both savers and hoarders. The more altruistic the savers,
the higher is the capital stock kM⋆ , and the higher is their share. When the degree of
altruism of the savers increases, νHO/νSP decreases and, thus, even if the shares of
both savers and hoarders diminish, the hoarders loose more that the spenders. When
the factor of altruism of a dynasty of hoarders increases, then the share and the amount
of capital held by the hoarders increase at the only expenses of savers. In other words,
variation is the degree of altruism of hoarders have not impact on the share of capital
held by the spenders.
Our findings are summarized in table 4.
13This fact implies that, even if the spenders save, we can consider that they do not hold wealth.
Indeed, in a successive generations model, that is, a model without retirement period, the spenders
do not hold any wealth.
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Variations of capital sharing
Equilibrium I Equilibrium II
(two-class) (three-class)
Spenders Hoarders Spenders Savers Hoarders
µSP µHO νSP νSA νHO
Increase of Parameter
Altruism Degree γ of WA Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged
Altruism Degree γM of SA Unchanged Unchanged Decreased Increased Decreased
Altruism Degree γ of HA Decreased Increased Unchanged Decreased Increased
Wealth Preference δ of HA Decreased Increased Unchanged Decreased Increased
Table 4: Changes in Wealth Distribution according to individual parameters.
To sum up, the dynasties that bequeath are in a strong position in the way capital
is shared. In the two-class equilibrium, the hoarders impose their view and in the
three-class equilibrium, both hoarders and savers impose theirs. It is important to see
the key role played by the preference for wealth. Whatever the final equilibrium the
share of capital held by the hoarders increases with their preference for wealth.
To illustrate numerically the relevance of our model we consider the three-type
setting used previously for illustrate the possibility of dynamic inefficiency. We now
introduce a scenario to illustrate the fact that the relation between wealth holding and
altruism is not as simple as thought previously. Figure 2 represents the case where:
γ2 = 0.8, γ3 = 0.5, δ = 0.5, β = 0.5, α = 1/3, A = 1 and n = 0.
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Figure 2: Share of capital held by the hoarders (Scenario 2)
As soon as p3 > 0.06, we have a two-class equilibrium. We see that as p3 increases
beyond this threshold value the share of capital held by the hoarders increase from a
share 0.225 (p3 = 0.06) to 1 (p3 = 1). Consequently, even though hoarders are less
altruistic than the strong altruists, they end up holding relatively more wealth. In the
example depicted Figure 2, the hoarders hold almost 25% of total wealth even though
they are poorly altruistic and only represent 5% of total population.
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4 Alternative fiscal policies
We now turn to alternative fiscal policies such as PAYG pension system, public debt
and estate taxation. We want to see how the results obtained in optimal growth models
with spenders and/or savers change or can be extended with the introduction of the
hoarders.
4.1 Pay-as-you-go pensions
Our PAYG pension system consists of a payroll levy, τt, paid in period t by workers
and a pension benefit, θt, paid to the retirees of generation t−1 so that θt = (1 + n) τt.
Then, the budget constraints (1) and (2) become:
wt + x
h
t − τt = c
h
t + s
h
t and Rt+1s
h
t + θt+1 = d
h
t+1 + (1 + n) x
h
t+1 (16)
We begin our study of the incidence of PAYG pension system in our economy with
a fraction of hoarders by focusing both on the savings and the bequests behavior of
each types of individuals.
Obviously, the spenders do not leave bequest. Then, after calculus, their savings
and their bequests satisfy:
∀h < M sh⋆(τ) =
βw⋆(τ)− [β + φ⋆(τ)]τ
1 + β
and xh⋆(τ) = 0 (17)
Concerning the hoarders, they always bequeath and the equilibrium conditions (9)
always holds. Using ω˜⋆(τ) = w⋆(τ)− [1−φ⋆(τ)]τ the part of the life-cycle income Ω
h
⋆(τ)
independent of h, their savings and their bequests is such that:
∀h > M sh⋆(τ) =
ζh⋆ (τ)w⋆(τ)
1 + β
−
τ [β + φ⋆(τ)]χ
h
⋆(τ)
1 + β
and xh⋆(τ) =
δ¯hω˜⋆(τ)
φ⋆(τ)− γ¯h
(18)
where:
ζh⋆ (.) = β +
δ¯h[β + φ⋆(.)]
φ⋆(.)− γ¯h
and χh⋆(.) = 1 +
δ¯h[1− φ⋆(.)]
φ⋆(.)− γ¯h
Finally, the strong altruists are savers if xM⋆ (τ) is positive and are spenders if x
M
⋆ (τ)
is nil. Then, we now distinguish these two cases to determine how the PAYG pension
system affect the capital accumulation.
When strong altruists are spenders, using both (17) and (18), we can rewrite (8)to
obtain at the equilibrium:
̥ [φ⋆(τ)] = −
τ
w⋆(τ)
ϑ[φ⋆(τ)] with ϑ[φ⋆(.)] = 1 +
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h[1− φ⋆(.)]
φ⋆(.)− γ¯h
(19)
Importantly, even if φ⋆(.) can be greater than one, the function ϑ[φ⋆(.)] is always
positive. Indeed, ϑ[φ⋆(.)] is a decreasing function of φ⋆(.) such that limφ⋆(.)→+∞ ϑ[φ⋆(.)]=
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1−
∑+∞
h=1 p
hδ¯h > 0. Note that, when τ = 0, we recoup (14).
When strong altruists are savers, the economy is at the MGR. Indeed, (12) holds
because the first order conditions (3) and (4) are not modified by the PAYG pension
system. Then, the equality (8) allows us to obtain, after some tedious computations,
the bequests of savers:
xM⋆ (τ) = ̥(γ
M)×
wM
pM
+
τ
pM
× ϑ(γM) (20)
Note that, when τ = 0, we recoup (15).
From equations (19) and (20) we can now study the impact of a PAYG pension
system both on the long run capital accumulation of the economy, the redistribution
across the dynasties and the welfare of each dynasties.
Proposition 3 The effects of a PAYG pension system.
a – At the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the PAYG pension system reduces the
accumulation of capital. The decrease in savings of the spenders is not compensated by
the hoarders. Indeed, concerning both the bequest and the savings of the hoarders, the
impact of the PAYG pension system is ambiguous.
The introduction of the PAYG pension system can improve or worsen both the wel-
fare of the spenders and the one of the hoarders.
b – At the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the PAYG pension system has no
effects on the accumulation of capital. The decrease in the saving both of the spenders
and the hoarders is compensated by an increase of the savings of the savers. If the
bequest of the spenders remains nil, the introduction of the PAYG pension system re-
duces the one of the hoarders but increases the one of the savers. This introduction
increases the share of capital held by the savers but decreases the shares of capital held
respectively by the spenders and the hoarders.
The introduction of the PAYG pension system improves the welfare of the savers
but it worsens the welfare both of the spenders and the hoarders.
Proof – See Appendix C. 
According to (20), the equilibrium is a three-class one if and only if τ > τM ≡
−wM̥(γM )/ϑ(γM). If without PAYG pension we have a three-class equilibrium (case
where ̥(γM) > 0), this type of equilibrium remains so with PAYG regardless of
the size of τ . On the contrary, if the economy is in a two-class equilibrium without
PAYG pensions (case where ̥(γM) < 0) there exists a payroll tax rate τM above
which introducing a PAYG pension scheme will imply a three-class equilibrium. Then,
the introduction of a PAYG pension system can imply a transition from a spenders-
hoarders equilibrium to a spenders-savers-hoarders equilibrium. The opposite shift is
not possible. The intuition underlying this possible transition is that in the two-class
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equilibrium introducing a PAYG pension leads to capital decumulation in the long run.
This decline can lead to the capital level consistent with the MGR, for which we get a
three-class equilibrium.
In the two class equilibrium, the higher τ, the less do spenders save. The first
effect induces a drop in the capital stock. Furthermore this effect can be offset or
reinforced depending on the influence of the PAYG pension system on the level of
bequests and saving by the hoarders. Concerning the bequests of the hoarders, we
have (see Appendix C):
∀h > M
∂xh⋆ (k⋆(τ), τ)
∂τ
=
∂xh⋆(k⋆(τ), τ)
∂k⋆(τ)
∂k⋆(τ)
∂τ
−
δ¯h[1− φ⋆(τ)]
φ⋆(τ)− γ¯h
When α and τ are sufficiently low we show that the first term of RHS is positive.
Then, if the equilibrium value k⋆(τ) is low enough, hoarder’s bequests increase with τ.
Intuitively, the introduction of the PAYG pension system leads to an increase in the
second period income of the hoarders. This wealth gain in the second period induces
the hoarders to increase their bequests. Note however that when the equilibrium is
dynamically inefficient (i.e., φ[k⋆(τ)] < 1), the second term of the RHS is negative and
the effect of the PAYG pension system on the hoarder’s bequests is ambiguous. This
effect can even be positive as the first term of the RHS can also be negative when τ
and α are sufficiently high. Intuitively bequests by the hoarders can decrease as the
PAYG pension system has a depressive effect on first-period income. Thus there exists
a wealth loss in the first period that depresses bequests by the hoarders.
Concerning the saving of the hoarders we establish that it is reduced by the PAYG
pension system when their bequests are themselves reduced. Conversely, note that
the fact that the PAYG pension system increases the bequest of the hoarders is not
sufficient to imply an increase in the saving of the hoarders. Intuitively, it exists two
antagonist effects when τ increases. First, according to (6) an increase of the bequest
xh⋆ = x
h
t = x
h
t+1 imply an increase of the saving of the hoarders when the prices w and R
are given. However, it also exists when τ increases a “general equilibrium effect” which
leads to reduce the capital stock and, consequently, w⋆ and φ(R⋆). According to (6),
when xh⋆ = x
h
t = x
h
t+1 is given this effect implies a decrease of the saving of the hoarders.
To sum up PAYG pension systems always generate a drop in saving by spenders.
This decline can be accompanied by a drop in the saving of the hoarders thus rein-
forcing the decrease in the stationary capital stock. On the contrary, a PAYG scheme
can also lead to an increase in the saving of hoarders. Yet this possible increase is too
weak to compensate for the decline in the saving of spenders. In other words, PAYG
pension systems are not macroeconomically neutral when the economy is in a two-class
equilibrium at the outset.
Things are different when society is segmented in three classes at the start. In that
case, the PAYG pension system is neutral given that the stationary stock of capital
is consistent with the MGR capital stock. This neutrality result generalizes those ob-
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tained by Barro (1974), Michel and Pestieau (1998) and Mankiw (2000). In that case,
neutrality property obtained in the “savers-spenders” literature resists to the introduc-
tion of hoarders-altruists.
Even if the PAYG pension system has no effect on the stationary stock of capital,
it modifies the long run wealth distribution because saving by the three classes is af-
fected by the fiscal policy. That of the spenders and the hoarders decreases and that
of the savers increases. Saving by the hoarders and the spenders does not equally react
to a change in the payroll tax because bequests by the savers and the hoarders don’t
move in the same way. PAYG pension systems increase bequests by the savers while
reducing those by the hoarders. Intuitively, the hoarders have a bequest motive that
is related to wealth accumulation. Their bequests are thus a constant proportion of
income wM⋆ − (1 − γ
M)τ , which decreases with τ . Things are different for the savers
as their bequests increase with τ, given that xM⋆ (τ) = x
M
⋆ (0) + τϑ(γ
M )/pM . Following
equation (8), the sum of all the bequests (i.e.,
∑N
h=1 x
h
⋆) is constant in the savers-
spenders-hoarders equilibrium. Thus as τ is raised, increased bequests by the savers
fully compensate the drop in bequests by the hoarders.
The fact that, contrary to the capital stock, wealth distribution is modified is al-
ready a result obtained by Michel and Pestieau (1998) or Mankiw (2000): they show
that a PAYG pension system implies wealth redistribution from the spenders to the
savers. Introducing hoarders extends those results: the fraction of capital they hold
νHO(τ) decreases with τ . There is thus some redistribution from hoarders to savers.
Then, a PAYG pension system, which seemed unfair in “savers-spenders” models, is in
fact a fiscal policy which hurts the top wealthy. The direction of redistribution between
spenders and hoarders is ambiguous; it depends on the proportion of hoarders; it has
to be high enough so that νHO(τ)− νSP (τ) increases with τ .
The effect of a PAYG pension system on individual welfare14 depends on the type
of equilibrium we are concerned with. In the two-class case, both k⋆ and R⋆ vary with
τ . Thus, the welfare of the spenders can be written as:
V SP⋆ (τ) = (1 + β) ln ω˜⋆(τ) + β lnR⋆(τ) + cst
As R⋆(τ) increases with τ but w⋆(τ) decreases, the variations of V
SP
⋆ (τ) can be
ambiguous. For low values of τ , ω˜⋆(τ) and R⋆(τ) vary in opposite directions. As w
′
⋆(τ)
and φ′⋆(τ) are both negative, ω˜⋆(τ) is a decreasing function if we are in underaccumu-
lation. On the contrary, if we are in overaccumulation, ω˜⋆(τ) increases with τ and the
PAYG pension system may increase the welfare of the spenders. Moreover, the welfare
of the hoarders is given by:
V HO⋆ (τ) = V
SP
⋆ (τ) + δ
h ln ω˜⋆(τ) + (1 + β) ln{φ⋆(τ)− γ¯
h + δ¯h[1− φ⋆(τ)]}
−(1 + β + δh) ln(φ⋆(τ)− γ¯
h) + cst
14Given that dh⋆ = βR⋆c
h
⋆ and Ω
h
⋆ = c
h
⋆+d
h
⋆/R⋆, the long run welfare of a dynasty h can be rewritten
as V h⋆ = (1 + β) lnΩ
h
⋆ + β lnR⋆ + δ
h lnxh⋆ + cst where Ω
h
⋆(τ) = ω˜⋆(τ) + [1− φ⋆(τ)]x
h
⋆ (τ).
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The relation between V HO⋆ (τ) and τ is also ambiguous. However, when the pref-
erence for wealth is weak enough and if there is a lot of overaccumulation, a PAYG
pension system increases the welfare of the hoarders. Henceforth, in overaccumulation,
a PAYG pension system may be Pareto improving. After all, this is not a surprising
result.
In the case of a three-class equilibrium the welfare incidence is easier as the stock of
capital kM⋆ , and thus R
M
⋆ , don’t depend on τ . Thus, both the welfare of the spenders
and the hoarders can be rewritten as:
V SP⋆ (τ) = (1+β) ln[w
M
⋆ −(1−γ
M )τ ]+cst and V HO⋆ (τ) = (1+β+δ
h) ln[wM⋆ −(1−γ
M)τ ]+cst
Hence, one clearly sees that τ has a depressive effect on the welfare of these two
types of dynasties. Turning to the savers, we have:
V SA⋆ (τ) = ln[w
M
⋆ + (1− γ
M)(xM⋆ (τ)− τ)] + cst
Since xM⋆ (τ) − τ − x
M
⋆ (0) = τ [ϑ(γ
M )/pM − 1] > 0, one clearly sees that τ has a
positive effect on the welfare of the savers.
We find here an extension of the key result of Michel and Pestieau (1998) and
Mankiw (2000) according to whom a PAYG scheme improves the welfare of the savers
while decreasing the welfare of the spenders. Their result resists to the introduction
of hoarders but their are gloss over by the fact introducing a PAYG pension system
increases the welfare of the savers but decreases the one of the hoarders; even if the
hoarders has an infinitesimal preference for wealth and consequently if the hoarders is
quasi similar to the savers.
4.2 Public debt
We now turn to the standard question of whether or not debt policy can be steady
state welfare improving. In each period, the government faces the budget constraint
Bt = (1 + rt)Bt−1 − LtTt, where Bt is the total level of debt in t and Tt is a lump-sum
tax paid by the working generation. We assume that the debt was used at time 0 to the
benefits of the retirees. There is no other government spending. We write bt = Bt−1/Nt
and assume that bt = b is constant. This yields Tt = (rt − n)b.
With this public debt scheme, only two equations are changed. The first period
budget constraint (1) is now:
wt + x
h
t − Tt = c
h
t + s
h
t (21)
and the relation linking capital and savings (8) becomes:
(1 + n)(kt+1 + b) =
h=N∑
h=1
phsht (22)
We begin our study of the incidence of public debt in our economy with a fraction
of hoarders by focusing focus both on the savings and the bequests behavior of each
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types of individuals. Obviously, the spenders do not leave bequest. Then, after calculus
and using the first period income net of tax b, ω˜⋆(b) = w⋆(b)− [R⋆(b)− (1 +n)]b, their
savings and their bequests satisfy:
∀h < M sh⋆(b) =
β
1 + β
ω˜⋆(b) and x
h
⋆(b) = 0 (23)
Concerning the hoarders, they always bequeath and the equilibrium conditions (9)
always holds. Thus, after some computations, their bequests and their bequest is such
that:
∀h > M sh⋆(b) =
ζh⋆ (b)ω˜⋆(b)
1 + β
and xh⋆(b) =
δ¯hω˜⋆(b)
φ⋆(b)− γ¯h
(24)
where ζh⋆ (.) is defined in equation (18).
Finally, the strong altruists are savers if xM⋆ (b) is positive and are spenders if x
M
⋆ (b)
is nil. We now distinguish these two cases to see how the public debt affects the capital
accumulation.
When strong altruists are spenders, using the equilibrium condition (22) we obtain
after some calculus:
̥ [φ⋆(b)] = −
(1 + n)b
φ⋆(b)w⋆(b)
ϑ[φ⋆(b)] (25)
where ϑ[φ⋆(.)] is defined in equation (19). Note that, when b = 0, we recoup (14).
When strong altruists are savers, the economy is at the MGR capital stock kM⋆ .
Indeed, (12) holds because the first order conditions (3) and (4) are not modified by
the public debt scheme. Then, the equation of capital accumulation (22) allows us to
obtain, after some tedious computations, the bequests of the savers:
xM⋆ (b) = ̥(γ
M )×
wM⋆
pM
+
(1 + n)b
γMpM
× ϑ(γM ) (26)
Note that, when b = 0, we recoup (15).
From equations (25) and (26) we can now study the impact of the public debt both
on the long run capital accumulation of the economy, the redistribution across the
dynasties and the welfare of each dynasties.
Proposition 4 The effects of a public debt.
a – At the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the public debt always reduces the accu-
mulation of capital. When the stationary capital stock without debt is in under ac-
cumulation of capital, then both the savings of the spenders and the bequests of the
hoarders are reduced by the public debt. However, it is possible that both the savings
of the spenders and the bequests of the hoarders are augmented when the stationary
capital stock without debt is in over accumulation of capital. Concerning the savings of
the hoarders, the impact of the public debt is ambiguous. Importantly, if the economy
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without debt is dynamically inefficient, it exists a constant public debt policy bG which
restore the dynamic efficiency by leading the economy at the GR equilibrium.
The introduction of the public debt can improve or worsen both the welfare of the
spenders and the one of the hoarders.
b – At the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium, the public debt has no effects on
the capital accumulation. The decrease in the saving both of the spenders and the
hoarders is compensated by an increase of the savings of the savers. If the bequest
of the spenders remains nil, the introduction of the public debt reduces the one of the
hoarders but increases the one of the savers. This introduction increases the share of
wealth (capital plus bonds) held by the savers but decreases the shares of wealth held
respectively by the spenders and the hoarders.
The introduction of the public debt improves the welfare of the savers but it worsens
the welfare both of the spenders and the hoarders.
Proof – See Appendix D. 
As in the case of a PAYG pension system, the public debt can make the econ-
omy shift from a two-class equilibrium to a three-class equilibrium, the reverse be-
ing impossible. The reason is simple: a three-class equilibrium occurs if and only if
b > bM ≡ −̥(γM )wMγM/[(1+n)ϑ(γM)]. Then, if without debt the equilibrium is one
with three classes (case where ̥(γM ) > 0), it remains so with debt and whatever the
level of the debt. On the contrary if, without debt, the equilibrium is one with two
classes (case where ̥(γM) < 0), then there exists a level of debt bM above which public
borrowing leads to a three-class equilibrium. This change of regime is made possible
because in a two-class equilibrium public borrowing reduces steady-state capital accu-
mulation. This reduction can be such that the steady-state capital stock converges to
the MGR, which implies a three-class equilibrium.
At the two-class equilibrium, contrary to the PAYG pension system case, the saving
of the spenders is not always reduced by public borrowing because it increases with
ω˜⋆(b). Then, as capital stock is reduced (i.e, k⋆(0) > k⋆(b)), saving by the spenders is
always reduced by the public debt when R⋆(b) > 1+n, i.e. when k⋆(b) is below the GR
level of capital. However, when k⋆(b) is above the GR level saving by the spenders is
reduced (resp: increased) by public borrowing if W⋆(b) is larger (resp: lower) than one
whereW⋆(b) = w⋆(0)/ω˜⋆(b). According to (24), the bequest of the hoarders is always re-
duced by the public debt when k⋆(b) (and consequently k⋆(0)) is in under-accumulation
of capital. However, when W⋆(b) < 1 (in this case, the capital stock k⋆(0) is necessarily
in over-accumulation) the bequest of the hoarders is reduced (resp: augmented) by the
public debt if W⋆(b) is larger (resp: lower) than ς
h
⋆ (b) = (φ⋆(0)− γ¯
h)/(φ⋆(b)− γ¯
h) > 1.
Since ζh′⋆ (b) > 0, we have ζ
h
⋆ (b) > ζ
h
⋆ (0). Then, the saving of the hoarders is augmented
by the public debt when W⋆(b) < 1. When W⋆(b) > 1 this saving is augmented (resp:
reduced) according to ζh⋆ (b) is larger (resp:) than ζ
h
⋆ (0)W⋆(b).
To sump up the saving behavior that follows public borrowing in the two-class
equilibrium, we distinguish among three cases. When W⋆(b) > ζ
h
⋆ (b)/ζ
h
⋆ (0) > 1, public
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borrowing reduces saving by both the spenders and the hoarders. When ζh⋆ (b)/ζ
h
⋆ (0) >
W⋆(b) > 1, saving by the spenders decreases and that by the hoarders increases fol-
lowing the introduction of the public debt. When W⋆(b) < 1, both savings increase.
Note that this latter case is only operative if the equilibrium without debt is below the
GR This case is surprising and impossible with PAYG pension systems. The reason is
that aggregate private saving is not, contrary to the PAYG pension system case, equal
to just the stock of capital, but to the stock of capital plus bonds. Thus in case (iii),
k⋆(b) + b increases with respect to b even if k⋆(b) decreases.
From an initial situation of overaccumulation, we show that there exists a level of
debt bG ∈ (0, bM) that leads to the GR capital stock. We thus find for this hetero-
geneous society the result obtained by Diamond (1965) for a society consisting only
of spenders: public debt can lead to a Pareto optimal growth path. In such a society
consisting only of spenders, if at the outset the economy is in under accumulation,
the public debt is welfare worsening in the steady-state. With heterogeneous agents,
this negative effect is mitigated because when b reaches bM the economy switches to a
three-class equilibrium in which the stock of capital corresponds to the MGR and is
invariant to the public debt.
Public debt has no macroeconomic effect on the three-class equilibrium. This neu-
trality result at the aggregate level strengthens the intuition that just one saver is
enough to obtain Ricardian equivalence. Michel and Pestieau (1998) and Mankiw
(2000) show that this result keeps holding with the introduction of spenders. Here we
show that it resists to the further introduction of hoarders.
As in the case of PAYG pension systems, if the public debt is neutral in aggre-
gate terms, it modifies wealth distribution because the saving of our three classes of
individuals change. Saving by the spenders and the hoarders is reduced and that
by the savers is increased. Saving by the hoarders and the spenders does not react
equally to public borrowing because of bequests. Public debt increases bequests of
the savers while reducing bequests of the hoarders. Hoarders leave a bequest that
is a proportion of the income ω˜M⋆ (b) = w
M
⋆ − (1 + n)(1/γ
M − 1)b which declines
as b increases. Things are different for the savers; their bequests increase with b as
xM⋆ (b) = x
M
⋆ (0) + (1 + n)bϑ(γ
M )/(γMpM). However, the sum of all the bequests is an
increasing function of b in the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium. Hence, in contrast
with the PAYG pension system case, the savers necessarily increase their bequests by
an amount higher than what is necessary to compensate the decrease of bequests by
the hoarders when b increases.
The fact that, contrary to the capital stock, wealth distribution is modified is al-
ready a result already obtained for PAYG pension systems. The share of capital held
by the savers increases with b whereas the share held both by the spenders and the
hoarders decreases. The direction of redistribution between the hoarders and the savers
is ambiguous; it depends on the proportion of hoarders in society. Consequently, if the
government wants to hurt the hoarders (i.e., the top wealthy) and to favor the savers,
it can use a PAYG pension or a public debt.
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Concerning individual welfare15, as we now show, the distinction between two types
of equilibrium is going to provide for the effect of the public debt results quite similar
to those obtained for the effect of a PAYG pension system. At the spenders-hoarders
equilibrium, we have for the welfare of the spenders:
V SP⋆ (b) = (1 + β) ln ω˜⋆(b) + β lnR⋆(b) + cst
As R⋆(b) increases and w⋆(b) decreases with b, the variations of V
SP
⋆ (b) can be
ambiguous. For low variations of b, ω˜⋆(b) and R⋆(b) vary in opposite directions. As
w′⋆(b)− R
′
⋆(b) is negative, remark that ω˜⋆(b) decreases with b when φ⋆(b) < 1. On the
contrary, ω˜⋆(b) increases with b in case of overaccumulation and thus the public debt
improves the welfare of the spenders. The welfare of the hoarders is given by:
V HO⋆ (b) = V
SP
⋆ (b) + δ
h ln ω˜⋆(b) + (1 + β) ln[φ⋆(b)− γ¯
h + δ¯h(1− φ⋆(b))]
−(1 + β + δh) ln(φ⋆(b)− γ¯
h) + cst
The relation between V HO⋆ (b) and b are also ambiguous. However with weak prefer-
ence for wealth and important overaccumulation introducing public debt increases the
welfare of the hoarders. In that case, public debt is Pareto improving.
Moving to the three-class equilibrium, one writes the welfare of spenders as:
V SP⋆ (b) = (1 + β) ln[w
M
⋆ − (1/γ
M − 1)(1 + n)b] + cst
As to the hoarders, their welfare is:
V HO⋆ (b) = (1 + β + δ
h) ln[wM⋆ − (1/γ
M − 1)(1 + n)b] + cst
Thus, the higher public debt, the lower the welfare of both the spenders and the
hoarders is. Turning to the savers, we have:
V SA⋆ (b) = ln[w
M
⋆ + (1− γ
M)(xM⋆ (b)−
b(1 + n)
γM
)] + cst
Since xM⋆ (b)−b(1+n)/γ
M−xM⋆ (0) = b(1+n)[ϑ(γ
M )/pM−1]/γM > 0 and ϑ(γM ) > 1,
introducing public borrowing increases the welfare of the savers.
To sum up, we have the same type of results as for the PAYG pension. Un-
constrained altruists benefit from national debt whereas both the hoarders and the
spenders welfare decreases.
15Given that dh⋆ = βR⋆c
h
⋆ and Ω
h
⋆ = c
h
⋆+d
h
⋆/R⋆, the long run welfare of a dynasty h can be rewritten
as V h⋆ = (1 + β) lnΩ
h
⋆ + β lnR⋆ + δ
h lnxh⋆ + cst where Ω
h
⋆(b) = ω˜⋆(b) + [1− φ⋆(b)]x
h
⋆ (b).
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4.3 Estate taxation
We now turn to a third instrument that is natural in a setting where bequests play
such an important role: inheritance or estate taxation. Again, we focus on the steady
state solution. The tax scheme is simple: an estate tax of fixed rate κ ∈ [0, 1) that is
redistributed in each period t in a lump-sum way in an amount θt, the same for all.
Hence, the revenue constraint is simply equivalent to:
θt = κ
N∑
h=1
phxht
Then, the first budget constraint (1) of an agent of dynasty h becomes:
wt + (1− κ)x
h
t + θt = c
h
t + s
h
t (27)
Moreover, given θt, the optimal condition for saving (3) is unchanged but that for
bequests both of the savers and the hoarders (4) and (5) are now distorted:
∀h ≤M −
(1 + n)β
dht+1
+
γh(1− κ)
cht+1
≤ 0 (= if xht+1 > 0) (28)
∀h > M −
(1 + n)β
dht+1
+
δh
xht+1
+
γh(1− κ)
cht+1
= 0 (29)
We now want to see what is the incidence of estate taxation in our economy with
a fraction of hoarders. In particular, we focus both on the savings and the bequests
behavior of each types of individuals. Obviously, the spenders do not leave bequest.
Then, after calculus and using the notation ω˜⋆(κ) = w⋆(κ) + θ⋆(κ), their savings and
their bequests satisfy:
∀h < M sh⋆(κ) =
β
1 + β
ω˜⋆(κ) and x
h
⋆(κ) = 0 (30)
Concerning the hoarders, they always bequeath and (9) always holds. Thus, after
computations, their savings and their bequests are such that:
∀h > M sh⋆(κ) =
ζˆh⋆ (κ)ω˜⋆(κ)
1 + β
and xh⋆(κ) =
δ¯hω˜⋆(κ)
φ⋆(κ)− γ¯h(1− κ)
(31)
where ζˆh⋆ (κ) = δ¯
h[β(1 − κ) + φ⋆(κ)]/[φ⋆(κ) − γ¯
h(1 − κ)] + β. Note that, larger is the
redistribution θ⋆, larger is the bequest of the hoarders whereas larger is the tax rate κ,
lower are the bequests of the hoarders.
Finally, the strong altruists are savers if xM⋆ (κ) is positive and are spenders if x
M
⋆ (κ)
is nil. We now distinguish these two cases to see how the estate taxation affects the
capital accumulation.
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When the strong altruists are spenders, we can use the equilibrium condition (1 +
n)k⋆(κ) =
∑M
h=1 p
hsh⋆(κ) to obtain after some calculus:
Λ(φ⋆(κ), κ) ≡
β(φ⋆(κ)− ε)
ε(φ⋆(κ) + β) + κβ(φ⋆(κ)− ε)
−
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
φ⋆(κ)− γ¯h(1− κ)
= 0 (32)
When κ = 0, we recoup (14) since Λ(φ⋆(0), 0) = ̥(φ⋆(0)).
When the strong altruists are savers, according to (28) we have φ⋆(κ) = γ
M(1−κ).
Then, contrary to the public debt scheme or the PAYG pension system, an estate tax
modifies the stock of capital of the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium. Indeed, the
MGR capital stock is affected by the estate taxation since we have in long run:
kM⋆ (κ) =
[
αAγM(1− κ)
1 + n
] 1
1−α
Then, larger is the tax rate κ, lower is the long run capital stock kM⋆ (κ). We can
remark that this capital stock does not depend on the proportion of the savers, the
spenders or the hoarders. In the no tax case, this capital stock is obviously the one of
the MGR. Using the fact that φ⋆(κ) = γ
M (1 − κ), equation (8) allows us to obtain,
after some tedious computations, the bequests of the savers:
xM⋆ (κ) =
{
β
ε
[ γM(1− κ)− ε
γM + β + κγM
]
−
[γM + β + κβγM/ε
γM + β + κγM
] N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
γM − γ¯h
}
wM⋆ (κ)
pM
(33)
where wM⋆ (κ) = A(1− α)k
M
⋆ (κ)
α.
From equations (32) and (33) we can now study the impact of an estate taxation
both on the existence of the steady states, the long run capital accumulation and the
redistribution across the dynasties. Given the complexity of the problem at hand, we
make two simplifications. First we take a tax reform viewpoint by focusing on an
infinitesimal change in the tax rate at a zero level. Second we assume that N = M +1;
in other words, there is only one dynasty of hoarders.
Proposition 5 The effects of the estate taxation.
(a) At the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, with only one dynasty of hoarders, the
estate tax reduces the capital accumulation. It also depresses the bequest of the hoarders.
Its impact on savings is ambiguous. However, when the introduction of estate taxation
increases (decreases) the savings of the hoarders (spenders), it also increases (decreases)
the savings of the spenders (hoarders).
The introduction of the estate taxation can improve or worsen the welfare of both
the spenders and the hoarders. Note that estate taxation improves (worsens) the welfare
of the hoarders (spenders), it improves (worsens) also that of the spenders (hoarders).
26
(b) At the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium, estate taxation reduces the capital
accumulation. It reduces the savings of all the agents. It also depresses the bequest of
the savers but increases (decreases) that of the hoarders if the degree of altruism of the
savers is sufficiently high (low). Moreover, the introduction of estate taxation decreases
the share of wealth held by the savers but increases that held by the spenders and the
hoarders.
The introduction of estate taxation worsens the welfare both of the spenders and
the savers but increases (decreases) that of the hoarders if the degree of altruism of the
savers or their preference for wealth are sufficiently high (low).
Proof – See Appendix E. 
According to (33) we have a three-class equilibrium if and only if κ < κM ≡
ε(γM + β)Λ(γM , 0)/[1 +
∑N
h=M+1 p
hδ¯h/(γM − γ¯h)]. Thus if, in the absence of estate
tax, we have a two-class equilibrium ̥(γM ) = Λ(γM , 0) < 0, we keep this type of equi-
librium with estate taxation. On the contrary, if we have a savers-spenders-hoarders
equilibrium without estate taxation ̥(γM) = Λ(γM , 0) > 0, there is a positive level
of taxation κM above which the equilibrium becomes a spenders-hoarders equilibrium.
Hence, introducing an estate tax can lead to go from a three-class equilibrium to a two-
class one; the other way around is not possible. Estate taxation has thus the opposite
effect relative to public debt and PAYG pension.
What is the intuition of such a switch of regime? Public debt or PAYG pension
system induces the strong altruists to increase their bequests and hence reinforces the
portion of savers and may lead to a switch of regime from two- to three-classes. Estate
taxation discourages bequeathing by the strong altruists and may lead to the disappear-
ance of savers. Consequently, the only possible switch is that from three- to two-classes.
We now analyze the behavior of different agents in the two types of equilibrium. In
the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, according to (30), saving by the spenders depends
on ω˜⋆(κ). Then, according to Appendix E, there exists two opposite effects. The first
one follows from the decrease of capital accumulation triggered by estate taxation; the
second one is redistributive and follows from the lump-sum transfer financed by estate
taxation. Concerning saving by the hoarders, beyond the two effects just mentioned,
there is a third one due to changes in ζˆN⋆ (κ). This third effect is negative. Hence if
estate taxation increases saving by the hoarders, then it also increases saving by the
spenders. Conversely, if estate taxation depresses saving by the spenders, it also de-
presses saving by the hoarders. Turning to the level of bequests by the hoarders (one
single dynasty) it can be expressed as xN⋆ (κ) = δ¯
Nw⋆(κ)/{φ⋆(κ)− γ¯
N +κ(γ¯N−pN δ¯N)}.
As the numerator decreases and the denominator increases with κ, the estate tax has
a depressive effect on the bequests of the hoarders.
In the three-class equilibrium, estate taxation has quite different effects. First of
all, let us remember that it has a depressive incidence on capital accumulation. This
is a result that is consistent with that obtained by Mankiw (2000) and Michel and
Pestieau (1998). As in the two-class equilibrium, saving varies with disposable income
27
ω˜⋆(κ). However, ω˜⋆(κ) decreases with κ when the rate of estate taxation is low and
ζˆh⋆ (κ) = β + δ¯
h(β + γM)/(γM − γ¯h) does not depend on κ. Thus, according to (30)
and (31), savings of both spenders and hoarders decrease when κ decreases, contrary
to what is happening in the two-class equilibrium.
As to the influence of κ on saving by the savers, consider first the effect of κ on their
bequests described by (33). The higher the estate tax rate, the lower the bequests by
the savers are. Since (1+β)sM(κ) = βω˜⋆(κ)+(1−κ)(γ
M+β)xM⋆ (κ), this negative effect
of taxation on bequests has an impact on saving. The first term of the RHS decreases
with κ (for low κ) and the second term always decreases with κ. Consequently, estate
taxation depresses saving by the savers.
To sum up, for low tax rates, saving by the three types of agents decreases and
capital accumulation goes down unambiguously. This is in contrast with the neutral
effect of either public debt or unfunded pensions.
Turning to the bequests of the hoarders, according to (31), there exists two opposite
effects when κ increases and calculations of Appendix E lead to:
∀h > M
∂xh⋆ (κ)
∂κ
∣∣∣
κ=0
≷ 0 if and only if γM ≷
αβ
αβ + 1− α
.
Thus contrary to the bequests of the savers, the bequests of the hoarders don’t nec-
essarily decrease as a result of estate taxation. The sign of the variation of hoarders’
bequests depend on savers’ characteristics (degree of altruism) and not on their own
characteristics (degree of altruism and preference for wealth). This is typically a gen-
eral equilibrium result. The key economic variable is disposable income of the hoarders
in the second period: R⋆(κ)s
h
⋆(κ). We know that for the hoarders, s
h
⋆(κ) decreases for
low value of κ and that R⋆(κ) = (1+n)/[γ
M(1−κ)] increases with κ. We show that for
low κ, xh
′
⋆ (0) and R
′
⋆(0)s
h
⋆(0)+R⋆(0)s
h′
⋆ (0) have the same sign. The lower saving by the
hoarders is more then compensated by the increase of the interest factor. This increase
is particularly important when the degree of altruism of the savers is high enough.
This result is surprising in several respects. First, it does not concern the savers
whose bequests always decrease. It applies to the hoarders even if they have a very low
degree of altruism. Altruism and preference for wealth determine the level of bequests
of the hoarders, but not how these bequests react to estate taxation. Note that all
dynasties of hoarders behave identically as to an increase or a decrease of their be-
quests. This is quite different from what we observe in the two-class equilibrium where
bequests are always negatively influenced by estate taxation.
Estate taxation affects also wealth distribution in the three-class equilibrium. It in-
creases the share of capital held by the spenders and the hoarders at the expense of the
share held by the savers. If the government wants to hurt the savers, it can introduces
estate taxation. Estate taxation is clearly a questionable instrument of redistribution:
it hurts the wealthy, but favors the top wealthy.
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We now turn to the incidence of estate taxation on welfare16 in the two kinds of
equilibrium. Starting with the two-class equilibrium, the welfare of the spenders is:
V SP⋆ (κ) = (1 + β) ln ω˜⋆(κ) + β lnR⋆(κ) + cst
As R⋆(κ) increases with κ and the sign of ω˜
′
⋆(κ) is ambiguous, the reaction of welfare
of the spenders when κ varies is also ambiguous even for low values of κ. As to the
welfare of the hoarders, we have:
V HO⋆ (κ) = V
SP
⋆ (κ) + (1 + β) ln ζˆ⋆(κ) + δ
N ln xHO⋆ (κ) + cst
The effect of estate taxation here is also ambiguous even though we know that both
ζˆ⋆(κ) and x
HO
⋆ (κ) decreases with κ when κ is small.
In the three-class equilibrium, the welfare of the spenders is:
V SP⋆ (κ) = (1 + β) ln ω˜⋆(κ) + β lnR⋆(κ) + cst
where ω˜⋆(κ) decreases with κ whereas R⋆(κ) increases with low κ. According to Ap-
pendix E, this last effect is always dominated by the first effect at the capital stock
kM⋆ (κ). Then, a (low) increase of (low) κ worsens the welfare of the spenders. Turning
to the savers, we have:
V SA⋆ (κ) = (1 + β) lnΩ
SA
⋆ (κ) + β lnR⋆(κ) + cst
and we can show that a (low) increase of (low) κ worsens the welfare of the savers.
Note that the decrease of the welfare of the savers is larger than the decrease of the
welfare of the spenders. We find here one of the main results of Michel and Pestieau
(1998): estate taxation worsens the welfare both of the spenders and the savers. Do
we find the same result for the hoarders? From (31) their welfare can be written as:
V HO⋆ (κ) = (1 + β + δ
h) ln ω˜h⋆ (κ) + β lnR⋆(κ)− δ
h ln(1− κ) + cst
and we can show that:
∂V HO⋆ (κ)
∂κ
∣∣∣
κ=0
≷ 0 if and only if γM ≷
β[1 + α(β + δh)]
β[1 + α(β + δh)] + δh(1− α)
Thus if the altruism of the savers is sufficiently strong, estate taxation can have a
positive effect on the hoarders, namely on bequeathers who expectedly should be pe-
nalized. This surprising result can be explained by the general equilibrium mechanism
described previously that leads to increased bequests by the hoarders. However, note
that the degree of altruism of the savers that is needed to increase the welfare of the
hoarders is higher than that needed to increase their bequests. These increases occur
when the reduction of saving by the hoarders is more than compensated by the increase
in interest rate. We have seen that an increase in bequests by the hoarders does not
16Given that dh⋆ = βR⋆c
h
⋆ and Ω
h
⋆ = c
h
⋆+d
h
⋆/R⋆, the long run welfare of a dynasty h can be rewritten
as V h⋆ = (1 + β) lnΩ
h
⋆ + β lnR⋆ + δ
h lnxh⋆ + cst where Ω
h
⋆(κ) = ω˜⋆(κ) + [1− κ− φ⋆(κ)]x
h
⋆ (κ).
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depend on their altruism nor on their preference for wealth. The increase in utility
depends (positively) on δh.
To sum up, we have found a new reason to deal with estate taxation with caution.
If the objective of such a tax is to fight top wealth holding, we have shown that society
might be better off without it.
5 Conclusion
Traditional macroeconomic models rest on the assumption that agents are either altru-
istic or not and look at the shape of wealth distribution and at the effect of alternative
fiscal policies on both capital accumulation and wealth distribution. Though very in-
sightful these models fail to reflect some real life features, particularly the fact that
wealth is not predominantly held by altruistic agents. Empirical studies point out to
the fact that wealth accumulation, specially top wealth accumulation, is not motivated
by the presence of children but by some type of preference for wealth or for the power
and the prestige that wealth conveys. To incorporate this relevant and important fact,
this paper considers agents who are characterized not only by some degree of altruism,
but also by some preference for wealth. It appears that with this double heterogeneity
results obtained with the sole difference in altruism don’t hold true (see Table 1, 2, 3
and 4). One does not obtain necessarily the MGR; in fact, overaccumulation can occur.
Also, we don’t have necessarily the neutrality of either public borrowing or unfunded
pensions. We also show that estate tax depresses both the capital accumulation and
the bequest of the altruists with no preference for wealth but not necessarily the one
of the altruists with preference for wealth.
Above all our paper helps to understand why in reality top wealth is not held by the
most altruistic individuals. Introducing preference for wealth allows for distinguishing
two types of equilibrium, with and without the MGR prevailing. In the equilibrium
with MGR, the most altruists impose their own rate of time preference, but they don’t
necessarily hold the bulk of wealth. Thus, we explain the top tail of the distribution
of estates by not only altruism, as usually done, but mainly by some dynastic taste
for wealth. Our finding is in the line of recent papers of Carroll (2000), De Nardi
(2004) or Reiter (2004) who explain the top tail of wealth distribution in the US and/or
Sweden economy by a capitalist spirit motive according to which capital provides utility
services directly, but not just through consumption. This is what we do here with our
preference for wealth. Then, our paper proposed an alternative modeling of dynamic
wealth distribution that is generally dealt with using calibrated versions of stochastic
growth models or using theoretical models with imperfect credit market.
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Appendix
Appendix A – Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1: Existence and uniqueness of the steady state.
Since γ¯N < φ(R⋆) and according to (12) and (14), we have a spenders-hoarders
society if and only if there exists φ(R⋆) > max{γ¯
N , γM} such that ̥(φ(R⋆)) = 0. As
we have:
̥
′(φ(R)) =
β(β + ε)
ε(φ(R) + β)2
+
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
(φ(R)− γ¯h)2
> 0
the function ̥(φ(R)) increases from −∞ to β/ε when φ(R) increases from γ¯N to
+∞. Then, there exists a unique solution φ(R⋆) > γ¯
N of the equation ̥(φ(R⋆)) =
0. Consequently, we have a spenders-hoarders society if and only if φ(R⋆) > γ
M
or equivalently if and only if ̥(γM) ≤ 0. When γ¯N > γM we have ̥(γM) ≤ 0.
Conversely, when γ¯N < γM , ̥(γM) ≤ 0 if and only if
∑N
h=M+1[p
hδ¯h/(γM − γ¯h)] ≥
β(γM − ε)/[ε(β + γM)].
According to (15), we have a savers-spenders-hoarders society if and only if xM⋆ > 0
i.e., if and only if ̥(γM) > 0. Using the definition of ̥(.) we obtain that ̥(γM) > 0
if and only if γ¯N < γM and
∑N
h=M+1[p
hδ¯h/(γM − γ¯h)] > β(γM − ε)/[ε(β + γM)].
Finally, the existence of equilibrium is always guaranteed by the fact that we have
necessarily ̥(γM) ≤ 0 (Equilibrium I) or ̥(γM) > 0 (Equilibrium II). The uniqueness
of the steady state comes from the fact that the conditions ̥(γM) ≤ 0 and ̥(γM ) > 0
cannot be satisfied at the same time.
Step 2: Steady state and degree of altruism of strong altruists.
According to Step 1, the steady state is a savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium if
and only if γM > γ¯N and ̥(γM) > 0. As
̥
′(γ) =
β(β + ε)
ε(γ + β)2
+
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
(γ − γ¯h)2
> 0
we obtain this kind of equilibrium as soon as γM > γ˜ where γ˜ > γ¯N is the unique
solution of ̥(γ˜) = 0. Since γM > γ˜ is a necessary and sufficient condition to obtain
a savers-spenders-hoarders society, the condition γM ≤ γ˜ is a necessary and sufficient
condition to obtain a spenders-hoarders society. As ̥′γ is positive and for all h > M+1,
̥
′
ph , ̥
′
δ¯h
and ̥′γ¯h are negative, the threshold γ˜ increases with the p
h, γh and δh of the
dynasties of hoarders but is independent of the ph and γh of the dynasties of spenders.
Step 3: The long run capital stock.
Using (6), (11) and (13) we can rewrite the capital accumulation equation (8).
a – At the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, according to Step 1 and (7), the stationary
capital stock k⋆ is the unique solution of ̥[(1 + n)k
1−α
⋆ /(αA)] = 0 such that (1 +
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n)k1−α⋆ /(αA) > γ¯
N . Since ̥′k⋆ is positive and since for all h > M + 1, ̥
′
ph, ̥
′
δ¯h
and
̥
′
γ¯h are negative, the capital stock k⋆ increases with the p
h, γh and δh of the dynasties
of hoarders but is independent of the γh of the dynasties of spenders.
b – According to (12), if xM⋆ is positive then the steady state capital stock k⋆
corresponds to the M.G.R. capital stock (i.e., f ′−1[(1 + n)/γM ]) and we have: k⋆ =
[αAγM/(1 + n)]1/(1−α) ≡ kM⋆ . Obviously, the higher γ
M , the higher is kM⋆ and neither
the proportion of each dynasty, nor the degree of altruism of both the spenders and
the hoarders affect kM⋆ .
Step 4: Dynamic efficiency of the capital stock.
a – By definition, the GR capital stock is kG = f ′−1(1 + n). This implies that
φ(RG) = 1. Then k⋆ is below, equal or above the GR level of capital if respectively
φ(R⋆) is smaller, equal to or larger than 1. As ̥(.) is an increasing function (see
Step 1) and since ̥(φ(R⋆)) = 0, k⋆ is below, equal or above the GR level of capital
accumulation if respectively ̥(1) is larger, equal to or smaller than zero. Since:
̥(1) =
β(1− ε)
ε (1 + β)
−
N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h
1− γ¯h
=
1
1 + β
[β(1− ε)
ε
−
N∑
h=M+1
phδh
1− γh
]
k⋆ is below, equal or above the GR capital if respectively
∑N
h=M+1 p
hδh/(1 − γh) is
smaller, equal to or larger than β (1− ε) /ε.
b – The GR capital stock is kG = f ′−1(1 + n) and the MGR capital stock is
kM⋆ = f
′−1[(1+n)/γM ]. Since f(.) is concave and γM ∈ (0, 1) we have kM⋆ < k
G. Then,
kM⋆ is in under-accumulation of capital. 
Appendix B – Proof of Proposition 2.
a – At the spenders-hoarders equilibrium, using the fact that αφ(R⋆)w⋆ = (1 −
α)(1 + n)k⋆ and since the saving of the hoarders is given by (11), we have:
µHO =
N∑
h=M+1
phsh
(1 + n)k⋆
=
ε
φ(R⋆)
[
N∑
h=M+1
ph +
h=N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h(β + φ(R⋆))
β(φ(R⋆)− γ¯h)
]
(34)
=
ε
φ(R⋆)
[
N∑
h=M+1
ph +
φ(R⋆)− ε
ε
]
=
ε
φ(R⋆)
N∑
h=M+1
ph + 1−
ε
φ(R⋆)
Using the same methodology, from the saving of the spenders given by (13), we
obtain:
µSP =
M∑
h=1
phsh
(1 + n)k⋆
=
ε
φ(R⋆)
M∑
h=1
ph
According to variations in k⋆ (see Step 3 of Appendix A), the higher the parameters
ph, γh, δh of a dynasty h of hoarders, the higher is µHO and the lower is µSP .
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b – At the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium, we have φ(R⋆) = γ
M . Then, the
methodology used to obtain (34) allows us to obtain:
νHO =
N∑
h=M+1
phsh
(1 + n)k⋆
=
ε
γM
N∑
h=M+1
ph
[
1 +
δ¯h(β + γM)
β(γM − γ¯h)
]
Using the fact that αφ(R⋆)w⋆ = (1−α)(1+n)k⋆ and since the saving of the spenders
is given by (13), we have:
νSP =
M−1∑
h=1
phsh
(1 + n)k⋆
=
ε
γM
M−1∑
h=1
ph
Given νHO + νSP + νSA = 1 we have:
νSA = 1− νHO − νSP = 1−
ε
γM
[
1− pM +
h=N∑
h=M+1
phδ¯h(β + γM)
β(γM − γ¯h)
]
The higher γM , the higher is νSA and the lower are νHO and νSP . The higher the
ph, γh, δh of a dynasty h of hoarders, the higher is νHO. 
Appendix C – Proof of Proposition 3.
Saving by a dynasty h in the PAYG pension system case is given by:
∀h sh⋆(τ) =
β
1 + β
w⋆(τ) +
β + φ⋆(τ)
1 + β
(
xh⋆(τ)− τ
)
(35)
a – We first prove that k⋆(τ) < k⋆(0) for all positive τ . According to (19) and since
ϑ(.) > 0, the spenders-hoarders equilibrium satisfies:
̥[φ(R⋆(τ))] = −
τ
w⋆(τ)
ϑ[φ(R⋆(τ))] < 0 = ̥[φ(R⋆(0))]
According to Step 1 of Appendix A , ̥(.) is an increasing function of φ(R). Then,
we have φ[R⋆(τ)] < φ[R⋆(0)] and consequently k⋆(τ) < k⋆(0) for all positive τ .
We now prove that for sufficiently low τ , this capital stock k⋆(τ) decreases with τ .
According to (19), k⋆(τ) is defined by:
ψ(k⋆, τ) = ̥
(
1 + n
αA
k1−α⋆
)
+
τ
(1− α)Akα⋆
ϑ
(
1 + n
αA
k1−α⋆
)
= 0
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we have k⋆ = k⋆(τ) and k
′
⋆(τ) = −ψ
′
τ (.)/ψ
′
k(.).
Since ψ′τ (.) = ϑ(.)/[(1− α)Ak
α
⋆ ] > 0, k
′
⋆(τ) has the sign of −ψ
′
k(.). Then:
sign of k′⋆(τ) = sign of
[
−
(1 + n)(1− α)
αAkα⋆
̥
′(.) +
τα
(1− α)Ak1+α⋆
ϑ(.)−
(1 + n)τ
αA2k2α⋆
ϑ′(.)
]
= sign of
[
−
(1 + n)(1− α)
α
̥
′(.)− τ
[ 1 + n
αAkα⋆
ϑ′(.)−
α
(1− α)k⋆
ϑ(.)
]]
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Since, ̥′(.) and ϑ(.) are positive and ϑ′(φ(R)) = −
∑N
h=M+1[p
hδ¯h(1− γ¯h)/(φ(R)−
γ¯h)2] is negative, there exists a threshold τ > 0 such that k′⋆(τ) is negative if τ is lower
than τ .
We now prove that the PAYG pension system reduces the saving of spenders. Using
(35), the saving of the spenders is given by (17). Since k⋆(0) > k⋆(τ), we have w⋆(0) >
w⋆(τ) which implies s
h
⋆(0) > s
h
⋆(τ) for all positive τ .
Finally, we prove that the savings and the bequests of hoarders are not necessarily
themselves augmented by τ . Indeed, according to (18), the bequest of hoarders can be
rewritten as:
∀h > M xh⋆ ≡ x˜
h(k(τ), τ) =
δ¯h[w(k(τ))− [1− φ(k(τ))]τ ]
φ(k(τ))− γ¯h
Then we have:
∀h > M
∂xh⋆
∂τ
=
∂x˜h(k(τ), τ)
∂k(τ)
∂k(τ)
∂τ
−
δ¯h(1− φ(k(τ)))
φ(k(τ))− γ¯h
(36)
One notes that ∂x˜h(k(τ), τ)/∂k(τ) has the sign of w′(k(τ))[φ(k(τ))−γ¯h]−w(k(τ))+
τφ′(k(τ))(1− γ¯h). Since φ′(k(τ)) is positive, for sufficiently low values of τ we have:
sign of
[
∂x˜h(k(τ), τ)
∂k(τ)
]
= sign of
[
w′(k(τ))[φ(k(τ))− γ¯h]− w(k(τ))
]
= sign of
[
(1 + n)(2α− 1)− (1− α)Aα2γ¯hk(τ)α−1
]
= sign of
[
(2α− 1)φ(k(τ))− α(1− α)γ¯h
]
Then, when α ≤ 1/2, ∂x˜h(k(τ), τ)/∂k(τ) is negative for low values of τ . As k′⋆(τ) is
negative for 0 < τ < τ , according to (36) the bequest of hoarders xh⋆(τ) is augmented
by a PAYG pension system when τ , α and k⋆(τ) are sufficiently low.
From (35) we can study the saving of hoarders. Since k⋆(0) > k⋆(τ), we have
w⋆(0) > w⋆(τ) and φ(R⋆(0)) > φ(R⋆(τ)) which obviously imply s
h
⋆(0) > s
h
⋆(τ) when
xh⋆(τ) < x
h
⋆(0). Then, when (36) is such that ∂x
h
⋆/∂τ is negative, an increase of
τ leads to a decrease in the saving of hoarders. Note that even if the bequest of
hoarders is increased by a PAYG pension system, the saving of hoarders does not
necessarily increase. Indeed, when xh⋆(τ) > x
h
⋆(0), we have s
h
⋆(τ) > s
h
⋆(0) if and only if
w⋆(0)−w⋆(τ) < {[β+φ(k⋆(τ))](x
h
⋆(τ)−τ)− [β+φ(k⋆(0))]x
h
⋆(0)}/β. To summarize, the
impact of a PAYG system both on the bequest and the saving of hoarders is ambiguous.
b – Since the FOC (4) and (5) are not modified by the PAYG pension system, the
equation (12) holds and, consequently, the economy is at the MGR capital stock kM⋆ .
Then, the PAYG pension system has no effects on the stationary capital stock of the
savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium.
Concerning the spenders, their bequests remain nil since (12) is unchanged. Using
(17), we obtain for the saving of a dynasty h of spenders: (1 + β)sh⋆(τ) = βw
M − (β +
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γM)τ . Then, the saving of the spenders decreases with τ . Using sh⋆(τ), we can focus
on the share of capital held by the spenders. After computation we obtain:
νSP (τ) = νSP (0)−
(β + γM)τ
(1 + n)(1 + β)kM⋆
M−1∑
h=1
ph
Thus the share of capital νSP (τ) held by the spenders decreases with τ .
According to (18), the bequest of a dynasty h of hoarders satisfies: (γM−γ¯h)xh⋆(τ) =
δ¯h[wM − (1− γM)τ ]. The bequest of hoarders decreases with τ . Using this value, we
also obtain the saving of a dynasty h of hoarders: (1 + β)(γM − γ¯h)sh⋆(τ) = [β(γ
M −
γ¯h)+(β+γM)δ¯h]− (β+γM)[γM − γ¯h+ δ¯h(1−γM)]τ . Then, the saving of the hoarders
decreases with τ . Using sh⋆(τ) we can focus on the share of capital held by the spenders.
After computation we obtain:
νHO(τ) = νHO(0)−
(β + γM)τ
(1 + n)(1 + β)kM⋆
N∑
h=M+1
ph
[
1 +
δ¯h(1− γM)
γM − γ¯h
]
Hence, the share of capital νHO(τ) held by the hoarders decreases with τ .
According to (20), the bequest xM⋆ (τ) of savers increases with τ . As p
MsM⋆ (τ) =
(1+n)kM⋆ −
∑h=M−1
h=1 p
hsh⋆(τ)−
∑h=N
h=M+1 p
hsh⋆(τ) and since both the saving of spenders
and hoarders decreases with τ , sM⋆ (τ) is an increasing function of τ . As the share of
capital held by the savers is such that νSA(τ) = 1 − νSP (τ) − νHO(τ) and as both
νSP (τ) and νSP (τ) decrease with τ , the share νSA(τ) increases with τ .
Finally, to compare the spenders and the savers we can use the fact that:
νHO(τ)−νSP (τ) = νHO(0)−νSP (0)+
(β + γM)τ
(1 + n)(1 + β)kM⋆
(M−1∑
h=1
ph−
N∑
h=M+1
ph
(
1+
δ¯h(1− γM)
γM − γ¯h
))
Consequently, the PAYG pension system reduces (resp: increases) νHO(τ)− νSP (τ) if
the hoarders are (resp: are not) sufficiently numerous.
Finally, the proofs concerning results on welfare are given in the main text (end of
section 4.1). 
Appendix D – Proof of Proposition 4.
The saving of a dynasty h in the debt case is given by:
∀h sh⋆(b) =
β
1 + β
ω˜⋆(b) +
β + φ⋆(b)
1 + β
xh⋆(b) (37)
a – We first prove that k⋆(b) < k⋆(0) for all positive b. According to (25) and since
ϑ(.) > 0, the spenders-hoarders equilibrium satisfies:
̥[φ(R⋆(b))] = −
(1 + n)b
φ(R⋆(b))w⋆(b)
ϑ[φ(R⋆(b))] < 0 = ̥[φ(R⋆(0))]
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According to Step 1 of Appendix A, ̥(.) is an increasing function of φ(R). Then,
we have φ[R⋆(b)] < φ[R⋆(0)] and consequently k⋆(b) < k⋆(0) for all positive b.
We now focus on the saving of the spenders. Using (37) we obtain the saving of the
spenders described in (23). Since k⋆(0) > k⋆(b), we have w⋆(0) > w⋆(b) which obviously
implies sh⋆(0) > s
h
⋆(b) when R⋆(b) > 1 + n, i.e., when k⋆(b) is in under-accumulation
of capital. When k⋆(b) is in over-accumulation of capital the saving of the spenders is
reduced (resp: increased) by the public debt if w⋆(0) is larger (resp: lower) than ω˜⋆(b).
The bequest of hoarders is given by (24). Since φ⋆(b) < φ⋆(0), we have x
h
⋆(b) < x
h
⋆(0)
when ω˜⋆(b) < ω˜⋆(0) = w⋆(0). Note that the bequest of hoarders is always reduced by
public debt when k⋆(b) (and consequently k⋆(0)) is in under-accumulation of capital.
However, when ω˜⋆(b) > w⋆(0) (in this case, the capital stock k⋆(0) is necessarily in over-
accumulation) the bequest of hoarders is reduced (resp: increased) by public debt if
w⋆(0) is larger (resp: lower) than ς
h
⋆ (b)ω⋆(b) with ς
h
⋆ (b) = (φ⋆(0)− γ¯
h)/(φ⋆(b)− γ¯
h) > 1.
According to (37), the saving of hoarders is described by (24). Since ζ ′⋆(b) > 0, we
have ζh⋆ (b) > ζ
h
⋆ (0). Then, the saving of the hoarders is increased by public debt when
ω˜⋆(b) > w⋆(0). When ω˜⋆(b) < w⋆(0) this saving is increased (resp: reduced) according
to ζh⋆ (b)ω˜⋆(b) is larger (resp:) than ζ
h
⋆ (0)w⋆(0).
According to (25), k⋆ is the capital stock of the spenders-hoarders equilibrium if
and only if:
∆(k⋆, b) = ̥
(
1 + n
αA
k1−α⋆
)
+
αb
(1− α)k⋆
ϑ
(
1 + n
αA
k1−α⋆
)
= 0
Since ∆′b(.) = αϑ(.)/[(1 − α)k⋆] > 0, we can use the Implicit Function Theorem
and, consequently, there exists a continuous function k⋆(.) of b such that k⋆ = k⋆(b).
According to (12), this function is defined as long as k⋆ is larger than k
M
⋆ . Ac-
cording to (26), we have xM⋆ = 0 when b ≡ b
M = −̥(γM)wMγM/[(1 + n)ϑ(γM )].
Then according to (25), when b = bM , the equilibrium is such that ̥[φ(R⋆)] =
wMγM̥(γM)ϑ[φ(R⋆)]/[w⋆ϑ(γ
M )]. Consequently, we have k⋆(b
M) = kM⋆ and k⋆(b) is
a continuous function of b defined on [0, bM ]. Its maximum is at b = 0 and its min-
imum at b = bM . Since the GR capital stock kG is larger than kM⋆ , there exists (by
continuity) a positive debt level bG ∈ (0, bM) such that the economy with the constant
debt level bG converges towards the GR capital stock kG whereas the economy without
debt is dynamically inefficient (i.e., k⋆(0) > k
G).
b – Since the FOC (4) and (5) are not modified by public debt, (12) holds and,
consequently, the economy is at the MGR capital stock kM⋆ . The public debt has no
effects on the capital stock of the savers-spenders-hoarders equilibrium.
Concerning the spenders, their bequests remain nil since (12) is unchanged. Using
(23), the saving of a dynasty h of spenders is such that (1 + β)sh⋆(b) = β[w
M − (1 +
n)(1/γM − 1)b]. Then, the saving of the spenders decreases with b. From this saving,
we can focus on the share of wealth (capital plus bonds) held by the spenders. After
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computation:
νSP (b) =
M−1∑
h=1
phsh⋆(b)
(1 + n)(kM⋆ + b)
=
β
[
wM − (1 + n)(1/γM − 1)b
]
(1 + n)(kM⋆ + b)(1 + β)
M−1∑
h=1
ph
Consequently, the share of wealth νSP (b) held by the spenders decreases with b.
According to (24), the bequest of a dynasty h of hoarders satisfies: (γM−γ¯h)xh⋆(b) =
δ¯h[wM − (1 + n)(1/γM − 1)b]. Consequently, the bequest of the hoarders decreases
with b. Using (24) the saving of the hoarders is given by (1 + β)(γM − γ¯h)sh⋆(b) =
[β(γM − γ¯h) + (β + γM)δ¯h][wM − (1 + n)(1/γM − 1)b]. Then, the saving of hoarders
decreases with b. Consequently, we can focus on the share of wealth held by hoarders.
After computation we obtain:
νHO(b) =
N∑
h=M+1
phsh⋆(b)
(1 + n)(kM⋆ + b)
=
β
[
wM − (1 + n)(1/γM − 1)b
]
(1 + n)(kM⋆ + b)(1 + β)
N∑
h=M+1
ph
[
1+
(β + γM)δ¯h
β(γM − γ¯h)
]
Hence, the share of wealth νHO(b) held by the hoarders decreases with b.
According to (26), the bequest xM⋆ (b) of savers increases with b. Since p
MsM⋆ (τ) =
(1 + n)(kM⋆ + b)−
∑h=M−1
h=1 p
hsh⋆(b)−
∑h=N
h=M+1 p
hsh⋆(b) and since the saving both of the
spenders and the hoarders decrease with b, sM⋆ (b) is an increasing function of b. As the
share of wealth held by the savers is such that νSA(b) = 1 − νSP (b) − νHO(b) and as
both νSP (b) and νSP (b) decrease with b, the share νSA(b) increases with b.
Finally to compare the spenders and the savers we can use the fact that:
νHO(b)−νSP (b) =
β
[
wM − (1 + n)(1/γM − 1)b
]
(1 + n)(kM⋆ + b)(1 + β)
(
N∑
h=M+1
ph
[
1+
(β + γM)δ¯h
β(γM − γ¯h)
]
−
M−1∑
h=1
ph
)
As a result the public debt reduces (increases) νHO(b)− νSP (b) if the hoarders are (are
not) sufficiently numerous.
Finally, the proofs concerning results on welfare are given in the main text (end of
section 4.2). 
Appendix E – Proof of Proposition 5.
The saving of a dynasty h in the estate taxation case is given by:
∀h sh⋆ =
1
1 + β
[
β(w⋆ + θ⋆) +
[
φ⋆(κ) + β(1− κ)
]
xh⋆
]
(38)
a –We first prove that k⋆(κ) < k⋆(0) for all positive κ when the economy experiences
only one dynasty of hoarders (indexed by N). In this setting, according to (32), the
spenders-hoarders equilibrium satisfies:
∇(φ⋆(κ), κ) ≡
β(φ⋆(κ)− ε)
ε(φ⋆(κ) + β) + κβ(φ⋆(κ)− ε)
−
pN δ¯N
φ⋆(κ)− γ¯N(1− κ)
= 0
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Then, we have:
∇′1 =
∂∇(φ⋆(κ), κ)
∂φ⋆(κ)
=
βε(β + ε)
[ε(φ⋆(κ) + β) + κβ(φ⋆(κ)− ε)]2
+
pN δ¯N
[φ⋆(κ)− γ¯N (1− κ)]2
> 0
∇′2 =
∂∇(φ⋆(κ), κ)
∂κ
=
pN δ¯N(γ¯N − pN δ¯N)
[φ⋆(κ)− γ¯N(1− κ)]2
> 0
Using, the Implicit Function Theorem we have φ′⋆(κ) = −∇
′
2/∇
′
1 < 0. Then, we
have φ[R⋆(κ)] < φ[R⋆(0)] and consequently k⋆(κ) < k⋆(0) for all positive κ.
With only one dynasty of hoarders, we have θ⋆(κ) = κp
NxN⋆ (κ). Then, according
to (31), xN⋆ (κ) = A(κ)/B(κ) with A(κ) = δ¯
Nw⋆(κ) and B(κ) = φ⋆(κ) − γ¯
N + κ(γ¯N −
pN δ¯N ). Consequently A′(κ) = δ¯Nw′⋆(κ) is negative and B
′(κ) = φ′⋆(κ) + γ¯
N − pN δ¯N .
Since φ′⋆(κ) = −∇
′
2/∇
′
1 we have φ
′
⋆(κ) = [p
N δ¯N − γ¯N ]/[1 + e] where e > 0. Then,
φ′⋆(κ) + γ¯
N − pN δ¯N > 0 and, consequently, B′(κ) is positive. Since A(.) decreases and
B(.) increases with respect to κ, the bequest xN⋆ (κ) of the (single) dynasty of hoarders
decreases with the estate tax κ.
To focus on the saving of the spenders and hoarders, we first determine how
ω˜⋆(κ) = w⋆(κ) + θ⋆(κ) varies when κ varies. Since θ⋆(κ) = κp
NxN⋆ (κ) and x
N
⋆ (κ) =
A(κ)/B(κ) we have ω˜⋆(κ) = [1 + κp
N δ¯N/B(κ)]w⋆(κ). Then, ω˜
′
⋆(0) has the sign of
pN δ¯Nw⋆(0)/B(0)− w
′
⋆(0). As w
′(κ)/w(κ) = αk′(κ)/k(κ), we can show that ω˜′⋆(0) has
the sign of αk′⋆(0)/k⋆(0) + p
N δ¯N/(φ⋆(0) − γ¯
N ). Thus the impact on ω˜⋆ of the intro-
duction of the estate tax is ambiguous since the first term of the R.H.S. is negative
whereas the second is positive.
According to (30), the savings of a dynasty h of spenders are such that s′h⋆ (0) has the
sign of ω˜′⋆(0). According to the previous paragraph, the impact of the estate taxation
on the savings the spenders is ambiguous.
Concerning the savings of the dynasty of hoarders, according to (31), s′N⋆ (0) has the
sign of ζˆ ′N⋆ (0)ω˜⋆(0)+ ζˆ
N
⋆ (0)ω˜
′
⋆(0). Thus the impact of the estate taxation on the savings
of hoarders is ambiguous. However, since ζˆ
′N
⋆ (κ) has the sign of −(1−κ)φ
′
⋆(κ)−φ⋆(κ),
ζˆ
′N
⋆ (0) has the sign of −φ
′
⋆(0)− φ⋆(0). Since φ
′
⋆(0) + γ¯
N − pN δ¯N > 0 and φ(0) > γ¯N ,
−φ′⋆(0) − φ⋆(0) < −p
N δ¯N < 0. As ζˆ
′N
⋆ (0) is negative, when the introduction of
estate taxation increases (decreases) the savings of hoarders (spenders), it also increases
(decreases) the savings of spenders (hoarders).
b – When the strong altruists are savers, according to (28) we have φ⋆(κ) = γ
M(1−
κ). Then, the MGR capital stock is affected by the estate taxation since we have
k⋆ = k
M
⋆ (κ) = [αAγ
M(1− κ)/(1+n)]1/(1−α). Then, the larger the tax rate κ, the lower
is the long run capital stock kM⋆ (κ).
Using this capital stock we can show after some tedious computations that ω˜⋆(κ) =
(1−κ)
1
1−α [Aκ2+Bκ+C]Π/[A′κ2+B′κ+C] where Π = A(1−α)[αAγM/(1+n)]1/(1−α),
A = −βγM(1+E), A′ = −εγM(1+E), B = B′+γM(β+ε), B′ = ε[γM−(β+γM)(1+E)],
C = ε(β + γM) and E =
∑N
h=M+1[p
hδ¯h/(γM − γ¯h)]. Then, one can show that, ω˜′⋆(0)
has the sign of B −B′ − C/(1− α) i.e. the sign of γM(β + ε)− ε(β + γM)/(1− α), i.e.
the sign of αγM − 1. Consequently, ω˜′⋆(0) is negative and the introduction of an estate
taxation reduces the income ω˜⋆.
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Note that ζˆh⋆ (κ) = δ¯
h[β+γM ]/[γM− γ¯h]+β ≡ ohM is independent of κ. According to
(30), and (31), the savings of a dynasty h of spenders are such that s′h⋆ (0) has the sign
of ω˜′⋆(0) whereas the savings of a dynasty h of hoarders has the sign of ζˆ
′h
⋆ (0)ω˜⋆(0) +
ζˆh⋆ (0)ω˜
′
⋆(0). Then, as ω˜
′
⋆(0) is negative and ζˆ
′h
⋆ (κ) is nil, the introduction of an estate
taxation reduces the savings of all dynasties of spenders and of hoarders.
To analyze the effect of κ on the savings of the savers we begin by focus on the
effect of κ on the bequests of the savers. According to (33), this bequest xM⋆ (κ)
is such that xM⋆ (κ) = G(κ)w
M
⋆ (κ)/H(κ) where G(κ) = β[γ
M(1 − κ) − ε] − [(γM +
β)ε + κβγM ]
∑N
h=M+1[p
hδ¯h/(γM − γ¯h)] and H(κ) = ε(γM + β + κγM). Since G′(κ) =
−βγM(1+
∑N
h=M+1[p
hδ¯h/(γM−γ¯h)]) is negative, H ′(κ) = εγM is positive and w
′M
⋆ (κ) =
α(1− α)A(kM⋆ )
α−1(κ)k
′M
⋆ (κ) is negative, x
M
⋆ (κ) decreases when κ increases.
Concerning the savings of savers, according to (38) we have (1+β)sM(κ) = βω˜⋆(κ)+
(1− κ)(γM + β)xM⋆ (κ). Then, as the first term of the RHS decreases for low κ and the
second term always decreases with κ, the introduction of an estate taxation depresses
saving by the savers.
Concerning the bequests of a dynasty h of hoarders xh⋆(κ), using (31) it is obvious
that x
′h
⋆ (κ) has the sign of ℓ
′(κ) where ℓ(κ) = ω˜⋆(κ)/(1− κ). Then, as ℓ
′(0) = ω˜′⋆(0) +
ω˜⋆(0) and ω˜
′
⋆(0) = ω˜⋆(0)[γ
M(β + ε)/C − 1/(1− α)], x′h⋆ (0) is positive if and only if γ
M
is larger than αβ/[αβ + 1− α].
We now focus on the impact of κ on the wealth distribution. Using (30) we can
focus on the share of wealth held by spenders. After computation we obtain:
νSP (κ) =
M−1∑
h=1
phsh⋆(κ)
(1 + n)k⋆(κ)
=
ω˜⋆(κ)
kM⋆ (κ)
M−1∑
h=1
βph
(1 + n)(1 + β)
.
Using (31) we can also focus on the share of wealth held by the hoarders. We
obtain:
νHO(κ) =
N∑
h=M+1
phsh⋆(κ)
(1 + n)k⋆(κ)
=
ω˜⋆(κ)
kM⋆ (κ)
N∑
h=M+1
ohMp
h
(1 + n)(1 + β)
To determine how νSP (κ) and νH0(κ) vary when κ increases we must study how
vary ψ(κ) = ω˜⋆(κ)/k
M
⋆ (κ). As we have ψ(κ) = e × [Aκ
2 + Bκ + C]/[A′κ2 + B′κ + C]
with e > 0, ψ′(0) has the sign of B − B′ = γM(β + ε). Then, ψ′(0) is positive and
consequently, the introduction of an estate taxation increases the shares of wealth νSP
and νHO held respectively by the spenders and the hoarders. Conversely, the fact that
νSA = 1 − (νSP + νHO) implies that the introduction of an estate taxation decreases
the share of wealth νSA held by the savers.
In the three-class equilibrium, the stock of capital is given by kM⋆ (κ) from which we
obtain:
W ′(0) ≡
ω˜′⋆(κ)
ω˜⋆(κ)
∣∣∣
κ=0
=
−β(1− αγM)
(1− α)(β + γM)
and R′(0) ≡
R′⋆(κ)
R⋆(κ)
∣∣∣
κ=0
= 1 (39)
From these two equalities, we look for the effect of κ on the welfare of our three
types of individuals. From the welfare of spenders and using (39), we have: V ′SP⋆ (0) =
(1 + β)W ′(0) + βR′(0) < 0.
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Turning to the savers, we know that x′M⋆ (0) < 0 and x
M
⋆ (0) > 0. Then, Ω
M
⋆ (0) >
ω˜(0) and Ω′M⋆ (0) < ω˜
′(0). Consequently, Ω′SA⋆ (0)/Ω
SA
⋆ (0) < W
′(0) which implies:
V ′SA⋆ (0) < V
′SP
⋆ (0).
Concerning the hoarders, from V HO⋆ (κ) we obtain: V
′HO
⋆ (0) = (1 + β + δ
h)W ′(0) +
βR′(0) + δh. Then, using (39), V ′HO⋆ (0) is positive if and only if γ
M is larger than
β[1 + α(β + δh)]/{β[1 + α(β + δh)] + δh(1− α)}.
Finally, the proofs concerning results on welfare are given in the main text (end of
section 4.3). 
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